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How  High  Are  the  Giants' 
Shoulders:  An  Empirical 
Assessment  of  Knowledge 
Spillovers  and  Creative 
Destruction  in  a  Model  of 
Economic  Growth* 
1. Introduction  and Summary 
There has been  a rapid growth  in recent years  in the theoretical litera- 
ture on industrial research as an engine  of economic  growth.'  At a gross 
level,  two  key  concepts  are at the  heart of  the  growth  process  in this 
literature.  First,  profit-seeking  firms  try  to  achieve  market  power  by 
producing  a better good  than their competitors.  Over time,  new  goods 
displace  old  ones,  earn  profits  for some  period  of  time,  and  are then 
displaced  in turn.  This process  of "creative destruction"  generates  the 
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incentive  for and limits  the private value  of industrial  innovation: 
...  The fundamental  impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist  engine in motion 
comes from the new  consumers' goods,  the new  methods of production or 
transportation,  the new markets, the new forms of industrial  organization  that 
capitalist enterprises  creates  ....  [examples]  ...  [these examples]  illustrate the 
same process of industrial  mutation  that incessantly  revolutionizes  the economic 
structure  from  within,  incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating  a 
new one. This process of Creative  Destruction  is the essential fact  about capital- 
ism.  .  .  . (Joseph  Schumpeter,  1942) 
Thus,  Schumpeter  recognized  that  innovation  was  the  engine  of 
growth,  and  that innovation  is endogenously  generated  by competing 
profit-seeking  firms. The second  key feature of models  of this process is 
that public-good  aspects  of knowledge  create economywide  increasing 
returns.  In the process  of creating new  goods,  inventors  rely and build 
on  the insights  embodied  in previous  ideas;  they  achieve  their success 
at least  partly by "standing  upon  the shoulders  of giants."2 The public 
stock  of  knowledge  that  accumulates  from  the  spillovers  of  previous 
inventions  is  thus  a fundamental  input  in  the  technology  to  generate 
new  ideas.  This  is  clearly reflected  in Schmookler's  (1966) description 
of the inventor's  problem: 
. . . the joint determinants of inventions are (a) the wants which inventions 
satisfy, and (b) the intellectual  ingredients of which they are made. The inven- 
tor's problem arises in a world of work and play, rest and action, frustration 
and  satisfaction,  health  and  sickness,  and  so on.  . ..  [I]n order to analzye  the 
problem, to imagine possible solutions to it, to estimate their relative  cost and 
difficulty, and to reduce one or more to practice, the inventor must use the 
science and technology bequeathed by the past . . . 
The  rich  theoretical  development  of  the  growth  literature  can  thus 
be  seen  as combining  the  insights  of Schumpeter  and Schmookler  and 
embedding  them  in  a general  equilibrium  framework.  This  modeling 
advance  has not,  however,  been  accompanied  by the development  of a 
parallel empirical literature.3 While there has been  significant  empirical 
work  on  different  aspects  of  the  microeconomics  of  technological 
change,  there  has  been  relatively  little  attempt  to integrate  individual 
micro  empirical  results  into  an  overall  framework  for  understanding 
growth.  Our aim in this paper is to create a framework for incorporating 
2. "If I have seen further  (than you and Descartes)  it is by standing upon the shoulders 
of Giants."  Sir Isaac  Newton, letter to Robert  Hook, February  5, 1675.  Newton's apho- 
rism  was popularized  by Robert  K. Merton,  On the  Shoulders  of Giants,  New York  (1965). 
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the  microeconomics  of  creative  destruction  and  knowledge  spillovers 
into  a model  of growth,  and  to do so in such  a way  that we  can begin 
to measure  them  and untangle  the forces that determine  their intensity 
and impact  on growth. 
We  develop  a model  in the  spirit of Grossman  and  Helpman  (1992) 
and  Aghion  and  Howitt  (1992) that gives  a simple  relationship  for the 
effect of new  products  on the value  of existing  ones.  At any given  time, 
the  economy  consists  of  a continuum  of  monopolistically  competitive 
goods  indexed  by  their  quality,  q E  (-w0,  Nt].  The  newest  goods  are 
always  the  best,  i.e.,  the  process  of research  advances  the  frontier by 
increasing  Nt.  Because  of  the  quality  ranking  implicit  in  this  process, 
constant  marginal  cost  producers  see  their  profits-relative  to  those 
of  the  (new)  leader-decline  over  time.  The  rate of  decline  depends 
(positively)  on the degree  of substitutability between  new and old goods 
and on the pace at which  new  goods  are introduced.  This captures  the 
endogenous  process  of creative  destruction  described  earlier and,  after 
a  few  algebraic  steps,  yields  intuitive  equations  relating  the  rate  of 
growth  in  a firm's  value  relative  to  that  of  the  industry  to  the  firm's 
number  of  new  ideas  relative  to the  industry  average.  By relating  the 
concept  of new  ideas  to that of new  patents,  it is possible  to use  these 
equations  to gauge  the empirical magnitude  of creative destruction. 
In order to estimate  these  equations,  we use market value and patents 
data on  567 large U.S  firms.  The data are annual  for the  period  1965- 
1981, and the firms are assigned  to 21 technological  sectors. We estimate 
21  sectoral  panels  and  find  that,  on  average  (over  time  and  sectors), 
creative  destruction  is about 4% per year.  That is,  in an average  sector 
at an average  year a firm that does  not invent  sees  its value  relative to 
that  of  the  industry  erode  by  about  4%. This  number  varies  widely 
across  sectors;  drugs  has  the largest  average  creative destruction,  with 
about 25% per year.4 Because  of both  the endogenous  variation in cre- 
ative  destruction  and  changes  in estimated  parameters,  we  also  find a 
sharp  decline  in  average  (across  sectors)  creative  destruction  over  our 
sample  period,  from a high  of 7% per year in the mid-1960s to a low  of 
2% in the late 1970s. 
Turning from Schumpeter  to Schmookler,  we focus on the technology 
by  which  new  ideas  are  produced,  using  as  inputs  private  research 
4. We argue  that,  at least  in part,  this  dispersion  is due  to the  difficulties  in measuring 
ideas,  because  patents  play different roles in protecting  innovation  in different sectors. 
In other industries  other mechanisms  of appropriations,  such as secrecy,  learning curve 
advantages,  and  marketing  and  product  support  efforts are more important  than pat- 
ents  as means  of securing  rents  (Levin et al.,  1987). 18 *  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
effort and  the  public  stock  of  existing  ideas.  We focus  particularly on 
this  ideas-stock,  the  process  by which  it accumulates,  and  the  way  in 
which  it conditions  the production  of new  ideas. 
It is well known  that the standard form of the kind of "quality ladder" 
model  that we  are using  embodies  a strong form of research spillovers, 
because  the  same  amount  of  resources  are  consumed  producing  the 
blueprint  for product  q =  Nt at time t as were  consumed  producing  the 
blueprint  for product  q =  Nt_dt  at time t  -  dt, even  though  the former 
is strictly superior  to the latter. To pursue  Newton's  metaphor,  today's 
inventors  stand  on  the  shoulders  of giants  that keep  getting  taller and 
never  get  old  and  weak.  In order  to  move  to  a spillover  formulation 
that can be implemented  empirically,  we  specify  how  the height  of the 
shoulders  is  endogenously  determined  by  the  path  of  previous  in- 
vention. 
We  postulate  a simple  linear  technology  at the  firm level,  mapping 
research  inputs  into  new  ideas.  This mapping  changes  over  time  as a 
function  of the  stock  of public  knowledge.  That is,  the  productivity  of 
private inputs  in research varies as a function  of aggregate  knowledge, 
which  is outside  the control of any individual  firm. We proceed  to spec- 
ify in  some  detail  the  process  by which  previous  knowledge  accumu- 
lates  and  feeds  into  the  generation  of new  ideas.  We postulate  that it 
takes  time  for additional  knowledge  to diffuse  sufficiently  to be of use 
to  other  inventors;  this  tends  to  limit  the  usefulness  of  very  recent 
knowledge  in  generating  new  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand,  old 
knowledge  eventually  is  made  obsolete  by  the  emergence  of  newer, 
superior  knowledge.  We call this phenomenon  "knowledge"  or "tech- 
nological"  obsolescence,  and  distinguish  it  from  the  obsolescence  in 
value  represented  by creative  destruction.  That is,  new  ideas  have  two 
distinct  effects  on  the  current  stock  of ideas.  They  make  the  products 
represented  by  those  ideas  less  valuable  (creative destruction  or value 
obsolescence),  and  they  make  the  knowledge  represented  by  those 
ideas  less  relevant  in the production  of new  knowledge  (knowledge  or 
technological  obsolescence).  The strength  of knowledge  spillovers,  and 
hence  the  growth  of  the  economy,  will  depend  on  the  parameters  of 
the processes  of knowledge  diffusion  and knowledge  obsolescence. 
At any  point  in time,  we  define  the  stock of knowledge  available to 
the production  of new  ideas  as the sum of the contribution  of all previ- 
ous  ideas.  These  contributions  are the  product  of the number  of ideas 
in each cohort  and  the usefulness  of the average  idea in that cohort to 
current inventions.  We describe  the usefulness  of an idea generated  at 
time  s for the  production  of new  knowledge  at time  t (t >  s) in terms 
of a citation function. In order to capture  knowledge  obsolescence,  this Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  * 19 
function  declines  with the distance between  t and s in ideas-space-i.e., 
with  the  number  of  inventions  that  occur  between  the  recipient  and 
source  cohorts.  In order  to  capture  gradual  knowledge  diffusion,  the 
usefulness  of old ideas  increases  with  the calendar time between  these 
two  cohorts.  We  also  allow  for a source-cohort  specific  multiplicative 
constant  that indexes  the potency  of the spillovers  emanating  from the 
average  idea in the given  cohort. 
In order to estimate  the citation  function,  we  use  a 1 in 100 random 
sample  of  all patents  granted  in  the  United  States  from  1975 to  1992, 
and track all their citations to previous  patents back to 1900. We assume 
that patents  are proportional  to ideas and that citations are proportional 
to ideas  used,  and we  estimate  time-varying  proportionality  factors for 
each  along  with  the  model  parameters.  Our  sample  contains  12,592 
patents  and  over 80,000 citations. 
Several interesting  findings  emerge  from estimating  the citation func- 
tion  and  from  constructing  the  stock  of  public  knowledge  implied  by 
this function.  First, we find that ideas diffuse quite rapidly, with a mean 
lag between  one  and two  years,  which  is consistent  with  previous  esti- 
mates by Mansfield  (1985) derived  from survey  results.  Second,  as pos- 
tulated,  knowledge  obsolescence  is clearly an endogenous  function  of 
the  number  of new  ideas,  rather than  an exogenous  function  of time. 
The  sum  of  squared  residuals  falls  by  about  30% when  straight  time 
depreciation  is replaced by endogenous  obsolescence  linked to the num- 
ber of new  ideas.  Third, the average  annual rate of knowledge  or tech- 
nological  obsolescence  over the century is about 7%, but both its secular 
and high-frequency  (endogenous)  changes  are quite large. It rises from 
about 3% at the beginning  of the century to about 10-12% in 1990, with 
a noticeable  plateau  during  the  1970s. Fourth,  the  average  size  of pat- 
ents  (measured  in terms of the average number of new  ideas embodied 
in each of these)  increased  over the century until the 1960s or 1970s and 
has declined  since  then.  A patent  in 1990 seems  to contain about three 
times more ideas than a patent in 1900, but about 10% less than a patent 
in 1970. Fifth, the potency  of the spillovers  emanating  from each cohort 
seems  to  have  declined  dramatically  over  the  century:  Controlling  for 
obsolescence,  we  estimate  that the average idea at the beginning  of the 
century generated  about five times the level  of spillovers  as the average 
recent idea.  Finally,  as a result  of this decline  in spillover  potency,  we 
estimate  that the effective  (or marginal) public knowledge  stock declined 
by about  30% from 1960 to  1990, suggesting  that private research pro- 
ductivity  should  have  fallen by that amount. 
This last result  is subject to a number  of caveats  relating to assump- 
tions  about the exact nature of the relationship  between  spillovers  and 20 ?  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
citations.  Its implications  are, however,  remarkably consonant  with  the 
data on  the  observed  productivity  of inputs  in research.  The observed 
decline  in the  productivity  of private  research,  as measured  by patent 
production,  has been  a subject of much  research.5 The ratio of patents 
to research inputs  has declined  steadily  since  the 1950s, almost  regard- 
less  of  the  way  research-input  is  measured  (e.g.,  R&D expenditures, 
number  of scientists  and engineers  engaged  in research).6 It is certainly 
interesting,  if not surprising,  that our independent  measure  of research 
productivity,  which  is based  on knowledge  flows  as measured  by cita- 
tions,  has  about the  same  trend as directly measured  productivity.  Put 
differently,  the fit of the aggregate  innovation  function-i.e.,  the func- 
tion  that  relates  aggregate  (private)  research  inputs  to  total  innova- 
tions-improves  markedly  once  we  include  our measure  of the  public 
stock of knowledge  on the right-hand  side. 
In the last step of the empirical section,  we relate aggregate consump- 
tion  growth  to the rate of new  idea creation.  In effect,  this amounts  to 
finding  the normalization  constant  that allows  us to estimate  the overall 
average  size  of  a patent-a  parameter  that  is  not  identified  from  the 
citation  estimation  alone.  With this,  we  have  empirical estimates  of all 
of the important  model  parameters.  Combining  these  estimates  with  a 
free-entry  condition  in  the  research  sector and  a labor market equilib- 
rium  condition,  we  close  the  model  and  calibrate it to  fit the  average 
rate  of  growth  of  the  United  States  during  the  postwar  period.  The 
model  can then  be used  to perform  several  positive  and normative  ex- 
periments.  Although  we  are uncomfortable  making too much of results 
that depend  on a long sequence  of assumptions  and approximations,  we 
note  that the model's  behavior  (1) is quite consistent  with the aggregate 
productivity  slowdown  in the 1970s, (2) is also consistent  with  the stock 
market boom  of the 1980s (because  the estimated  decline in the produc- 
tivity of research implies  an increase in the value of existing  ideas),  and 
(3) suggests  that  the  optimal  subsidy  to  private  R&D expenditures  is 
around  30%. 
We do not view  these  specific results  (which  are perhaps  better cate- 
gorized  as provocative  conjectures)  as the main contribution  of the pa- 
per.  Rather,  we  have  shown  that it is possible  to construct  an overall 
modeling  framework  into  which  the  key  microeconomic  pieces  of the 
processes  of industrial  innovation  and growth  can be fit, and empirical 
estimates  of  the  model  parameters  do  allow  the  model  to  mimic  the 
economy's  gross  growth  behavior. 
5.  See Griliches  (1989 and  1990), Kortum (1993), and Evenson  (1991). 
6. See  Kortum  (1993).  Schmookler  (1966) suggests  that  patents  per  research  effort  has 
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The next  pages  describe  the  details  behind  this  summary.  We begin 
in Section  2 with  the complete  presentation  of the model  itself.  Section 
3 presents  the empirical methodology  and results; for reasons  explained 
therein  it is organized  in a different  order than  this  summary  and  the 
model  presentation,  beginning  with  the  citation  function  and  ending 
with  the  creative  destruction  equation.  Section  4 calibrates the  model 
and  studies  the  impact  of  different  policy  and  structural  changes  on 
growth  and  research  incentives.  Section  5 concludes  the  paper  with  a 
discussion  of the overall  significance  of the results  and suggestions  for 
future work. 
2.  The Model 
2.1 GOODS MARKETS 
There is a representative  agent  endowed  with  a stock of ideas,  L units 
of  labor,  which  have  no  direct  utility  value;  an  instantaneous  utility 
function  that is logarithmic  in an aggregate  consumption  index,  Ct; and 
a discount  factor,  p. Using  aggregate  consumption  as  numeraire  and 
letting  rt represent  the real interest  rate, we  obtain the standard condi- 
tion  on the growth  rate of consumption,  Ct: 
t =  rt -  p.  (1) 
At any point in time,  the aggregate  consumption  index is a composite 
of the quality weighted  output  of a continuum  of monopolistic  competi- 
tors,  which  produce  goods  indexed  by their quality: xt(q) for q E  (-00, 
Nt].Quality  rises  monotonically  over time,  so newer  goods  are better:7 
~-  -  l/a 
rNt 
Ct=  f{xt(q)eq}dq  Oa  1.  (2) 
_f[oc 
Given  aggregate  consumption  and  the  prices  of each  of the  compo- 
nents  of it, pt(q), consumers  choose  xt(q) so as to minimize  the  cost  of 




7. It is important  to realize that the quality  ladder  aspect is in addition  to the monopolisti- 
cally competitive  structure  of the market.  Stokey's  (1992)  elegant and general  represen- 
tation of preferences  includes a discrete state space version of ours. 22 *  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
The first-order condition  for this problem yields  the system  of demands 
for goods  of different  qualities: 
xt(q)  =  p(q)-1/1-a)e(/1-  )qC,  (3) 
At each point in time, producers  take these  demand  functions,  as well 
as factor (labor) prices,  wt, as given.  For simplicity,  let the  production 
technology  be linear and assume  that process  innovations  have no dis- 
tributive impact:8 
xt(q) =  'qtLP(q),  (4) 
where  LP(q)  is labor allocated  to production  of xt(q) and  't  is labor pro- 
ductivity  in  the  final  goods  sector  at time  t. More generally,  this  may 
be taken  as the reduced  form of a constant  returns to scale technology 
including  other factors of production.  In the latter case the rental price 
of other  factors would  combine  to add a multiplicative  constant  to the 
reduced  form production  function. 
The linearity  of technology,  together  with  the  common  level  of pro- 
ductivity  and elasticities  of demand  faced by the infinitesimal  producers 
of the different  qualities,  determines  that at any given  point  in time all 




Replacing this expression  in Equation (3) and the results of it in Equation 
(2), determines  the consumption  wage: 
Wt =  (t  O)t  eNt 
Thus,  the  price can  also  be  expressed  in terms  of labor's productivity 
in the goods  sector,  'rt, and the quality level  of the leading  good,  Nt: 
t)  (q)  )  "e 
8. That is, these innovations affect the technologies of goods of all qualities  similarly. 
9. Because  of their  lower quality,  older  goods will have smaller  market  shares,  but because 
of the assumed desire for  variety  they never disappear  completely  (except  in the limiting 
case  o  =  1). Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  *  23 
Profits accruing to a producer of a good  of quality q can now be easily 
determined  from the equilibrium  values  of xt(q), pt(q), and wt:10 
,Tt(q)  =  aoCte(-ll  -)(Nt-q) 
It is interesting  to  notice  that  profits  do  not  fall with  increases  in a 
for all levels  of q. This is due  to a scope effect.  As  goods  become  more 
substitutable,  the  profits  generated  by having  a new-the  best-good 
increase  in  spite  of the  reduced  markup because  the new  product  has 
a larger potential  market.  The  other  side  of this  is that goods  become 
obsolete  much  faster  (for a given  rate of  entry)  because  many  newer 
goods  can  substitute  them  away:  Simply  put,  a  stronger  creative  de- 
struction environment-indexed  by a-is  better for those that are creat- 
ing and worse  for those  that have  created in the past. 
2.2 VALUATION,  INNOVATION,  AND LABOR  MARKET 
The fundamental  value  of a new  market created at time t is: 
Vt =  fT(Nt)  e  s  ddr. 
Dividing  both sides by aggregate  consumption,  letting Vt  vt/Ct,  differ- 
entiating  this  ratio  with  respect  to  time,  and  recalling  Equation  (1), 
yields  a differential equation  characterizing the dynamic behavior of the 
value  of an innovation  in terms of units  of consumption: 
ot  ]t  Vt_-'_lTtt(Nt)  Vt =  (P  +  1 -  ot  Ct 
Replacing  the expression  for profits in this equation  yields: 
(  a  t)  Vt -  o-a,  (5) 
which  is to be compared  with  the change  in the value  (in terms of units 
10. Note that if the number of varieties  is "small,"  as is the case in the standard  variety 
model  without  quality ranking where  q  E  [0,  NJ],  profits would  be  rt(q) = 
otCte(-a/i-)(Nt-9)l(1_  -  e-a)/N).  The ranking aspect of quality introduces a  "dis- 
counting-like"  component to the aggregators  so we can work immediately  with an 
"infinite-variety"  model. This eliminates  a host of short-run  dynamics  issues that are 
standard  in variety  models. Also see Stokey (1992). 24 *  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
of consumption)  of the idea  that has just been  left behind  the frontier, 
V?: 
V? =  pV, -  a.  (6) 
Comparing  Equations  (5) and  (6) shows  that the "obsolescence"  rate 
faced by owners  of blueprints  is (ox/1 -  cx)Nt, which  we  call the rate of 
creative destruction.  It is proportional  to the rate of advancement  of the 
knowledge  frontier. It also depends  on consumers'  demand  for variety; 
as  a  approaches  unity,  the  market  share  of  the  newest  product  ap- 
proaches  unity,  so we  truly have  a "gale" of creative destruction.  One 
focus of our empirical work will be to provide  estimates  of this term for 
different  industries  and periods.  We return to this later. 
The other  side  of the value  of an innovation  is the cost of generating 
it. As is standard in the literature, we  postulate  a simple linear research 
technology  at the firm level.  A firm that invests  Lr units  of effort in the 
time interval dt generates  OtLtdt  new  blueprints.ll  These blueprints  are 
worth  OtL Vt  Ctdt to the inventing  firm; thus,  free entry guarantees  that: 
Wt  0tVtCt, 
with  equality  if there is positive  innovation. 
Aggregating  over  all innovators  yields  the  demand  for labor by  the 
research sector:12 
Lt =  ' 
ot. 
Similarly,  we  can obtain  the  demand  for labor by  goods  producers, 
LP: 
Nf  t Xt(q)dq  =  taCt 
-oc  It  wt 
11. ot is  assumed  to be  deterministic  at the  aggregate  (sectoral)  level;  we  will  model  it 
later as a function  of past knowledge  accumulation  in the sector. We will assume  that 
Ot  is independent  of current and  previous  actions  by i, so the value  of any particular 
firm is  just  the  goods  market  value  of  its blueprints.  In other  words,  firms do  not 
have  private  stocks  of past knowledge.  We discuss  this issue  further in Section 3.2. 
12. Note  that Ot may depend  on aggregate  quantities,  including  LT,  although  in the latter 
case  the notation  is less  useful. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  25 
Full employment  equilibrium  in the labor market is then  obtained  by 
letting: 
Lp +  Lr =  L.  (7) 
2.3 SPILLOVERS,  KNOWLEDGE  DIFFUSION,  AND KNOWLEDGE 
OBSOLESCENCE 
The innovation  function  described  in words  above  corresponds  to the 
demand  for labor in the research  sector,  rearranged: 
N1t  =  OL.  (8) 
This equation  hides  in Ot  most  of what  is of interest  to economists.  It is 
the  average  productivity  of  research  in  generating  new  blueprints;  it 
may  contain  standard  aggregate factors of production  (e.g.,  capital and 
labor)13  as well  as spillovers  from past knowledge  production.  We will 
focus on the latter but discuss  briefly the former in the empirical section. 
With few  exceptions,  the  standard  endogenous  growth  model  treats 
Ot as an arbitrary given  constant.  Such a specification  conveys  a strong 
form of intertemporal  spillover,  where  the quality of new  goods  builds 
one  for  one  on  the  top  of  the  quality  of  the  previous  generation  of 
goods.  Labor productivity  in research-i.e.,  Ot-is  independent  of the 
level  or pace at which  ideas  emerge,  and is disconnected  from the spill- 
over process  itself. 
In this  section  we  explicitly  model  several  aspects  of the  process  of 
diffusion  of information  that should  influence  Ot In particular, we  con- 
sider  three  types  of  factors.  First, there  is  the  concept  of endogenous 
obsolescence.  Very old ideas  are unlikely  to contain much independent 
information  that  is  useful  for generating  new  ideas.  Unlike  the  tradi- 
tional notion  of "depreciation,"  the  obsolescence  of old ideas  ought  to 
be connected  to the distance  between  ideas  in the state rather than the 
time  dimension.  That is,  it is  not  the  passage  of  time  that makes  old 
ideas less  useful,  it is the accumulation  of new  ideas.  Second,  inventors 
take  time  in  seeing  others'  inventions,  which  suggests  that  there  are 
diffusion  lags.  Unlike obsolescence,  we treat the diffusion  of knowledge 
as a function  of time  rather than  accumulated  inventions.14 Third, the 
13. With either positive  or negative  coefficients,  thus,  with increasing or decreasing  aggre- 
gate  returns to scale in the research technology. 
14. Some  state  dependency  of knowledge  diffusion  is likely,  but it seems  plausible  that 
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spillover  intensity  between  cohorts  of ideas  may vary  independent  of 
the effect  of obsolescence  of old ideas. 
We capture these  factors of the transmission  mechanism  by means  of 
a "citations"  function,  a(t,  s) for t -  s.  We  assume  that  this  function 
depends  on the  probability  of seeing  or knowing  about an idea (t  -  s) 
years  old,  and the usefulness  of old ideas  in generating  new  ones.  We 
take  the  probability  of  seeing  an  idea  (t  -  s)  years  old  to  be  (1  - 
e-  (t-s)). As y ->  oo,  diffusion  becomes  instantaneous;  -y =  0 means  that 
all old blueprints  are unavailable,  so each inventor  starts from scratch. 
In order to capture  the  first and  last factors mentioned  earlier, we  as- 
sume  an  index  of  usefulness  of  the  form  be-  (Nt-Ns).  The  term  in  the 
exponential  reflects  the  notion  that  the  usefulness  of  old  ideas  in the 
generation  of new  ideas depends  on how  far the technology  has moved 
since  the  old  idea.  The parameter  8 could  capture two  distinct  effects. 
It could  represent  the "potency"  of the spillovers  emanating  from each 
cohort of ideas.  It could also represent an "absorption" parameter, mea- 
suring the intensity  of use  of old ideas by new  ideas.  The former inter- 
pretation  implies  that  8  might  vary  over  s;  the  latter  interpretation 
suggests  the possibility  of variation over t. In principle,  one could imag- 
ine  interaction  effects,  i.e.,  variations  over  (s, t) pairs.  In the empirical 
section,  we  focus on variation in 8 over s, i.e.,  variations in the potency 
of  the  spillovers  emanating  from  different  cohorts  of  old  knowledge. 
There are a combination  of conceptual  and practical reasons  for this,  as 
will be discussed  later. For now  we simply treat 8 as a constant,  because 
this  simplifies  the  explanation  of the  basic  elements  of  the  process  of 
knowledge  accumulation. 
The  citations  function  is  the  product  of  the  usefulness  of  old  ideas 
and the probability of having  seen  them:15 
a(t, s) =  be-P(Nt-Ns)  (1  -  e-Y(t-s))  t  s,  (9) 
with  y  -  0,  3  -  0, and 0 -  8  < 1. 
We  let  Ot  be  the  sum  over  all  the  potentially  "citable"  cohorts  of 
ideas:16 
15. We have saved on notation by working with a single-sector  model, but it would be 
straightforward  (from  a modeling perspective)  to add multiple sectors, with differing 
rates of obsolescence and diffusion within and across sectors. Empirical  implementa- 
tion of the multisector  version would not be trivial.  We will comment further  on this 
in Section 5 later. 
16. It is easy to add other standard  ingredients to O,,  including, e.g., decreasing  returns 
to current  labor  in research.  See, e.g., Kortum  (1993),  Stokey (1992),  Jones (1992).  We 
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ot-  a(t, s(q))dq =  a(t,s)Nsds, 
which  can be written  as: 
=  -  -  e  -(iNt+ t)  e~q+ys(q)dq.  (10) 
oc 
This  specification  of the  productivity  of research  effort,  Ot,  has  several 
interesting  features.  First, as the  speed  of diffusion  goes  to infinity,  Ot 
converges  to a constant: 
lim O  = -  (11) 
y-?--  P' 
The  insensitivity  of  the  research  productivity  parameter  to  the  rate of 
invention  in this limiting  case is the result of two offsetting  factors. The 
increased  obsolescence  of the existing  knowledge  stock that is inherent 
in an economy  moving  (inventing)  at a faster pace  is exactly  offset  by 
the increased  rate at which  new  knowledge  is added  to that stock. This 
is illustrated  in Figure 1. There,  we  depict  two  economies-A  and B- 
starting  with  the  same  level  of knowledge  (normalized  to 0), but in A 
inventions  occur at twice the rate of B (for reasons other than parameters 
of the innovation  function).  An inventor  standing  at t1 in A has a larger 
number  of inventions  behind  her, but the more rapid rate of invention 
means  that  a  larger  fraction  of  that  stock  is  now  obsolete.  Equation 
(11) says  that these  forces  exactly  cancel  each  other when  information 
diffusion  is instantaneous,  so that the marginal productivity  of research 
in the two economies  would  be the same.17 Put differently,  with instan- 
taneous  diffusion  the  right  "clock" for spillovers  is determined  by the 
number of inventions:  If the pace at which these occur increases,  so does 
the speed  of the economic  clock, bringing about offsetting  obsolescence, 
which  leaves  the amount  of spillover  unchanged  at the margin. 
Second,  for given  {Ns}st,  Ot  is proportional  to 8, which  is the fraction 
of total knowledge  that is of potential  use  for new  inventions.  Also,  if 
diffusion  is  instantaneous,  Ot is  inversely  proportional  to  the  rate  at 
which  new  ideas  outdate  old  ones,  P.  Thus,  putting  aside  diffusion 
lags,  the  strength  of spillovers  depends  directly on the exogenous  use- 
17. That  is,  a  given  amount  of  research  labor would  generate  the  same  N  in  the  two 
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fulness  of  old  knowledge,  8,  and  inversely  on  the  rate at which  it is 
made  obsolete,  P. 
The  third  important  feature  of  our formulation  for 0t is  that lags  in 
the diffusion  of information-i.e.,  y finite-change  the relation between 
the pace of inventions  and the productivity  of labor in research by intro- 
ducing  a form of dynamic  decreasing  returns.  If we  return to Figure 1, 
if  y is finite  it is no longer  true that the  marginal productivity  of labor 
in research at tl is the same in economies  A and B. Because of diffusion 
lags,  an increase  in the rate of innovation  does  not add to the  stock of 
knowledge  fast  enough  to  offset  the  higher  rate of obsolescence.  The 
fraction of the stock of knowledge  observed  by inventors  in an economy 
where  the rate of inventions  is relatively  high is limited by the fact that 
a large amount  of inventions  have  occurred only recently,  when  things 
are difficult  to  observe.  In other  words,  in  this  case  there is a second Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  29 
and exogenous clock that anchors  the economy.18  Thus, the productivity 
of research Ot  decreases with the rate of invention. 
The next step in presenting the model is to describe the dynamic 
equilibrium  behavior of the model. We postpone this until after estimat- 
ing the key parameters of the model, for then the examples used to 
characterize  equilibrium  can be made more meaningful. 
3. Empirical  Analysis 
3.1  OVERVIEW 
The previous section presented a general equilibrium  model of the pro- 
cesses of knowledge accumulation, research, innovation, product mar- 
ket competition, and economic growth. To estimate the parameters  of 
the model and to test its predictions against economic experience re- 
quires finding measurable empirical constructs that correspond to the 
elements of the model. In this section, we plunge in and make attempts 
to estimate each of the important blocks of the model. We do not at- 
tempt to estimate the overall system of equations implied by the model 
as a whole, because the theoretical  and empirical  compromises that are 
necessary to find empirical  counterparts  to the model constructs  cannot 
really be applied consistently across the different parts of the model. 
For example, the model has a highly stylized notion of "firms" who 
own no assets other than blueprints. The creative  destruction Equation 
(5) describes the time path of the value of blueprints or ideas. To esti- 
mate this equation, we will use data on real firms.19  To do this, we will 
derive the model's implications for the value of a firm, conceived as a 
collection of blueprints. This will involve assumptions that we believe 
are reasonable, but we do not go back and work out the overall  implica- 
tions of these assumptions for the model as a whole. Similarly,  confront- 
ing the data will require us to allow for lags between invention and 
patent applications, patent applications and patent grants, invention 
and new product introduction, etc. We try to allow for these lags in 
18. Although  the model  makes a stark distinction  between  lags (which occur by the "time 
clock") and obsolescence  (which occurs by the "invention  clock"), the effects discussed 
here will  occur as long  as the  speed  of diffusion  is less  responsive  to changes  in the 
rate of innovation  than is technological  obsolescence. 
19. The  closest  thing  to  an  empirical  analogue  of  the  value  of  an  idea  is  the  work  of 
Schankerman  and  Pakes  (1986), Pakes  (1986), and  Pakes and  Simpson  (1989) on  the 
value of patents.  As these  authors emphasize,  however,  they are estimating  the value 
of patent  protection,  i.e.,  the difference  between  the value  of the idea if it is patented 
and  its  value  if  it  is  not.  Pakes  (1985) estimates  the  stock  market  response  to  the 
"news"  represented  by  a new  patent.  Thus,  his  estimates  of  the  value  of a patent 
exclude  the  portion  that was  predictable  based  on past patents  and R&D. 30 ?  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
reasonable  ways,  but  we  do  not  formally  incorporate  them  into  the 
overall  model.  To say  it differently,  we  recognize  that the  loose  corre- 
spondence  between  the model  and the data prevents  us from interpret- 
ing the model  too literally. 
In the  following  subsections  we  will  discuss  measurement  issues  in 
some  detail.  Overall,  we  will  use  patents  as  corresponding  to  ideas, 
implying  the  number  of  patents  in  a period,  country,  sector,  etc.  can 
be  taken  as  proportional-sometime  with  lags-to  the  corresponding 
N.  We treat firms as agglomerations  of ideas,  represented  by their pat- 
ent  holdings;  we  take their  market value  as representing  the  value  of 
their idea portfolio.  We use counts  of Research Scientists and Engineers 
to represent  research labor, although  we explore the use of R&D expen- 
ditures  as well.  Finally, we  use  consumption  expenditure  from the Na- 
tional Income  Accounts  to measure  total expenditure. 
We present  the  empirical  results  in approximately  the  reverse  order 
from the model  development.  We begin with  the construction  of Ot, the 
productivity  of labor in research. To do this, we use a random sample of 
all U.S.  patents  granted since 1975, and the complete  history of previous 
patents  cited by our sample  patents.  We take a citation as evidence  that 
the  earlier knowledge  was  used  in the later invention,  suggesting  that 
the frequency  of citation can be used  to measure  a(t, s) in Equation (9). 
Because we  observe  many  (t, s) pairs, we  can estimate  the parameters 8 
and  y of Equation (9), while  at the same time estimating  a (time-varying) 
proportionality  factor between  patents  and  3N.  From this  estimation, 
we construct an estimate  of Ot  (up to additive and multiplicative factors). 
Next,  we  move  to  the  innovation  function,  Equation  (8). Using  the 
constructed  Ot  from the citation  distributions,  we  estimate  the relation- 
ship  between  patents  and  corporate  research  at the  aggregate  level  in 
the  United  States.  We show  that by converting  patents  to N using  the 
parameter  estimates  from the  first step,  including  Ot, and  normalizing 
the research measures  in the way implied by the model,  we can improve 
the fit between  patents  and research, and shed light on the puzzle  noted 
by many  researchers  of the  falling patent/R&D  ratio in the last several 
decades  (Griliches,  1989; Kortum,  1993). In Section  3.4,  we  look at the 
aggregate  U.S.  relationship  between  N and the growth rate of consump- 
tion,  and compare it to the prediction  of Equation (21). We find that the 
low-frequency  movements  in consumption  follow  a pattern very similar 
to those  in N, although  displaced  in time by a few years. We conjecture 
that this is consistent  with  the model  if there is a lag (not in the model) 
between  the  act of  invention  and  the  product  market introduction  of 
new  goods.  Finally,  we  return to the value  side  of the model.  We esti- 
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using  data on firms assigned  to technological  sectors.  We construct esti- 
mates  of the  rates of endogenous  obsolescence  or creative  destruction 
for these  sectors  during  the decade  of the  1970s. 
3.2 KNOWLEDGE  DIFFUSION,  TECHNOLOGICAL  OBSOLESCENCE,  AND 
PATENT  CITATIONS 
As discussed  in Section 2.3,  the limiting form of the model  has a strong 
form of spillovers  in which  the incremental  innovation  always  comes  at 
the  same  cost,  regardless  of  how  far knowledge  has  advanced.  More 
realistically,  inventors  can build on the existing  stock of knowledge,  but 
there  are limits  on  its  usefulness  in  creating  the  next  idea.  Equation 
(10) captures  the  more  general  case in which  the research productivity 
parameter  Ot depends  on the stock of existing  ideas,  with  each existing 
idea  weighted  by  the  probability  that  it  is  useful  in  generating  new 
knowledge  at time t. These  probabilities are, in turn, dependent  on the 
likelihood  that  the  previous  idea  is known  to a current inventor,  and 
the likelihood  that it is useful. 
To implement  this  approach,  we  use  patents  as  an indicator  of  the 
creation  of new  ideas,  and  the  "citations"  (also called  references)  that 
patents  make to previous  patents  as an indicator of "existing ideas used 
in the creation of new ideas."  There is a vast literature on the virtues and 
vices of patent data, which  addresses  such issues  as the large number of 
inventions  that are never patented;  variations in the "propensity  to pat- 
ent" of different institutions,  different industries  and over time; and the 
large variability in the  "size"  or importance  of individual  patents.20 For 
our  purposes,  we  will  simply  assume  that  Nt is  proportional  to  the 
rate of patenting  at time  t, with  the  proportionality  factor treated as a 
(time-varying)  parameter to be estimated. 
When  a patent  is  granted,  the  patent  document  identifies  a list  of 
references  or citations,  which  are previous  patents  upon  which  the cur- 
rent patent builds.21 The citations  serve the legal function  of identifying 
previous  patents  that delimit the property right conveyed  by the patent. 
Because  citations  indicate  that  a current invention  builds  on  an  older 
one,  we  will  use  the  total  number  of  citations  from patents  issued  in 
year t to patents  issued  in year s as an indicator of the use of knowledge 
of vintage  s in the production  of new  ideas  at time t. Of course,  not all 
citations  represent  spillovers;  it is possible,  e.g.,  that the inventor  was 
20. For a recent  survey,  see  Griliches (1990). 
21. References  are also made  to nonpatent  materials such as scientific articles; we are not 
using  this information.  For an application  that does,  see Trajtenberg, Henderson,  and 
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not even  aware of the earlier work at the time the invention  was made.22 
As with variations in the number  of new  ideas represented  by the aver- 
age  patent,  we  will  deal  with  variations  in  the  relationship  between 
citations and spillovers  by allowing  a (time-varying)  proportionality  fac- 
tor between  "ideas  used"  and  citations,  and estimating  this factor as a 
parameter.  Not  surprisingly,  the  need  to allow  for this  "slippage"  be- 
tween  citations  and spillovers  will limit to some  extent  the conclusions 
that we  can draw; we  return to this issue  later. 
Thus,  the  empirical  strategy  of  this  subsection  is  to  collect  citation 
frequencies  between  patent cohorts,  and use these  to estimate a(t, s) for 
many  t and s. We then  estimate  econometrically  a version  of Equation 
(9), obtaining  estimates  of the parameters 6 and y, the "potency"  of old 
ideas,  and the diffusion  rate of knowledge,  as well as the proportionality 
factors  that  map  patents  into  ideas  and  citations  into  "ideas  used." 
Producing  these  estimates  allows  us to do two  things.  First, we can use 
our  estimates  of  the  proportionality  factor between  patents  and  ideas 
to construct  a time  series  for Nt from the patent  series.  Second,  we  use 
the  estimates  of  the  parameters  from  the  citation  function,  combined 
with  the  Nt series,  to  construct  Ot, the  predicted  contribution  of  old 
knowledge  to the production  of new  ideas. 
Our  data  consist  of  a 1 in  100 random  sample  of  all patents  in  the 
United  States  granted  between  the  beginning  of  1975 and  the  fall of 
1992.23  Simple statistics on these  data are shown  in Table 1. They consist 
22. The final decision  as to what  citations must appear belongs  with  the patent examiner, 
but  it  is  the  result  of  an  interactive  process  involving  the  inventor,  the  inventor's 
attorneys,  and  the  examiner.  All  of  these  parties  can  identify  potential  citations  by 
searching  the relevant  "prior art." Until the late 1970s, this was  done  by hand,  using 
as a guide  the Patent Office classification  of the patent.  Today,  all parties have access 
to  on-line  text-search  capabilities.  The  incentives  faced  by  each  of  these  parties  are 
complicated.  First, the  applicant  bears a legal  obligation  to disclose  any  prior art of 
which  she  has  knowledge;  the  primary  sanction  for nonperformance  appears  to be 
the  danger  of losing  the good  will  of the examiner  (who  also makes  the decisions  as 
to whether  the patent will issue,  what claims will be permitted,  and so forth). Second, 
the applicant would,  in a sense,  prefer fewer citations,  because  citations may limit the 
scope  of the property  right. On the other hand,  omission  of important references  can 
be grounds  for invalidation  of the  patent,  giving  the  applicant  an incentive  to make 
sure that citations appear.  For the examiner,  identifying  citations not provided  by the 
applicant  is time-consuming.  It appears  that it is just as common  for applicants  and 
their attorneys  to press  for the  inclusion  of additional  references  as it is for them  to 
resist  inclusion  of references  (personal  communication,  Ms. Jane Myers,  U.S.  Patent 
Office).  For more  discussion  on  the  interpretation  of citations  as evidence  of knowl- 
edge  flows,  see  Trajtenberg, Henderson,  and Jaffe (1992), and Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson  (1993). 
23. Inventors  from every  country  in the world  take out  patents  in the United  States.  Of 
course,  other  countries  also  grant  patents.  We  will  use  the  phrase  "patents  in  the 
United  States"  to refer to patents  issued  by  the  U.S.  patent  office,  regardless  of the Table 1  PATENT STATISTICS BY CITING COHORT 
Number  Average  Modal 
of  Total  Citations  Average  Median  lag  Average  Median 
Citing  sample  sample  made  per  lag in  lag in  in  lag in  lag in 
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of 12,592 patents  containing  81,777 citations. The sample varies (because 
of variations  in the overall grant rate) from a low  of 443 patents  in 1979 
to a high  of 935 in  1991. We  have  valid  citations  going  as far back as 
1871.24  Thus,  we  have  observations  over  "t" from 1975 to 1992 and  "s" 
from 1871 to 1992. As can be  seen  from Table 1, the distributions  over 
(t  -  s)  have  extremely  long  tails.  The  mean  lag  in  years  is  about  16 
years; the median  is about  10, and the mode  is about 3. 
We want  to use  these  citation  frequencies  to estimate  a(t, s). Let Ct, 
be the observed  citations in the sample  from patents  in year t to patents 
in year s.25 Let St be the number  of sample  patents  in year t, and Ps be 
the number  of total patents  in the United  States in year s. Define 
a*(t, s) =_ C. 
Thus,  a*(t, s) is an estimate  of the  probability that a patent  in year t 
cites a patent  in year s. Panel (a) in Figure 2a shows  the distribution  of 
a*(t, s) over s from 1900 for each t. We restrict ourselves  to the distribu- 
tions  since  1900; before  that date the citation frequencies  are often zero 
or  one,  and  hence  are  very  noisy  estimates  of  the  true  frequency.26 
Panel  (b) shows  the  function  a*(t, s) for an  arbitrary year  (1985). The 
distributions  shown  in Figure 2a have  the  expected  "double  exponen- 
tial" shape.  Moreover,  the increasing  part is quite short, suggesting  that 
speed  of diffusion  is fast. We return to this below. 
nationality of the inventor or other considerations.  In this subsection, we utilize a 
sample of all such patents. In the next subsection, we will use the phrase "U.S. 
patents"  to mean patents (in the United States)  that derive  from  research  in the United 
States. 
24. The citations  are identified by patent number  in a commercial  database  produced  by 
Micropatent,  Inc. Patent numbers can be used to assign grant years for the patents, 
because numbers are used sequentially;  the patent number  of the first patent issued 
each year  back  to 1836  is published  in the Historical  Statistics  of  the  U.S. The Micropatent 
data contain a small but significant number (about .3%) of five-digit cited patents, 
which if correct would be patents issued before 1871. On inspection of the actual 
patent documents, we determined  that many of these are, in fact, not patent numbers 
at all but "reissue" numbers. Thus, without manual inspection there is no way to 
know if any of these five-digit  citations  are actually  valid early  patents. Thus, we have 
simply dropped them from the dataset  summarized  in Table  1. Citations  with six-digit 
or greater  patent numbers  appear  to all be valid. Because  patent number 100,000  was 
issued in 1870, we treat all citations 1871  or later as valid. 
25. Patents are dated here by the time of grant. We will discuss timing issues further 
later. 
26. We could, of course, estimate  the variance  of a*(t,  s) and weight accordingly,  but these 
estimations take very long to run as is. We decided that any additional  information 
present in the noisy early years was not worth the increase in computational  time 
necessary to include them. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  -35 
Figure  2a a*[t,  s1*1,000 
Figure  2b a*[85,sI*1,O000 
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To go from a*(t, s) to a(t, s), we must be explicit about the relationships 
between  (1) citations  and  "used  ideas"  and  (2) patents  and  N.  We as- 
sume that citations are proportional  to "used ideas" with a proportional- 
ity factor  (t. That is,  the  patent  office  and  its examiners  have  a set  of 
rules and practices that determine  what patents  actually get cited. These 
do not affect the actual use  of old knowledge  in the generation  of new, 
but they  do affect the number  of citations.  Further, these  practices can 
change  over  time.  We also  assume  that PN is proportional  to patents, 
with  proportionality  factor  it.27 We  can  think  of  4i/p as  the  "average 
size" of a patent.28 Many interpretations  can be given  to this "size" and 
its variation  over  time.  One  can think of each patent  as encompassing 
a set of distinct  ideas.  Alternatively,  because  not all ideas are patented, 
one  can think of il//  as the reciprocal of the probability that any given 
idea  is patented.  Because  we  care about Ij only  to the  extent  it lets  us 
use  patents  for N,  we  will consider  these  different  interpretations  only 
to the  extent  that they  help  us  think  about  the  plausibility  of the  esti- 
mates.  Using  Ct,,/4t  for "ideas  used"  and  (4I/)P  for N,  we  can write 
an expression  for a(t, s) in terms of observables  and parameters: 
~~~~ca(t,  s 
s 
(12/t)  a(t, s) = 
(4  2)'S,p  =(2/)  1la*(t,  s).  (12) 
Because  4t is purely  a measurement  parameter,  we  will  absorb  1/42 
into  it  and  simply  write  (<t from  now  on.  This  gets  us  almost  to  the 
point of being  able to rewrite Equation (9) (the expression  for the proba- 
bility than an idea will be used  as a function  of elapsed  time and elapsed 
N)  in term of observables.  The only  additional  step  is to note  that (Nt 
-  Ns)-the  number  of ideas  between  s and  t-is,  under  our assump- 
tions,  just the number  of patents  granted between  s and t, weighted  by 
the appropriate  tIs/p. Equation (9) can be rewritten: 
a*(t, s) = 
(t,ts,Ss  exp(-  PxPE  Px  (1 -  e-  (t-)),  t  .  (13) 
x=s  P 
Equation  (13) is the key  empirical construct  of the paper.  Because  of 
the  multiplicity  of parameters  and  unfamiliarity  of this  sort of data,  it 
requires  several  comments  before  we  proceed  to the  results.  First, be- 
27. We choose this parameterization  to emphasize that the parameter  P is not identified 
by the patent equation. We will identify it using the growth equation  below. 
28. The inverse of the "propensity  to patent" (Griliches,  1990). Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  37 
cause of the need  to estimate  the proportionality  factor between  patents 
and N, we  cannot  estimate  p from the citation data. That is, we can use 
Equation (13) to recover from the citation data the relative  size of patents 
in different cohorts in terms of ideas,  but we cannot estimate  the overall 
average  size  without  bringing  in additional  information.29 (We will use 
the  relationship  between  N and  growth  for this purpose.)  Second,  be- 
cause  we  have  multiple  observations  over both s and t, the parameters 
in this equation  are all identified  in principle,  up to a normalization  that 
sets  one  8s.30 
Third,  although  the  parameters  pt and  8s appear  symmetrically  in 
Equation (13), we  interpret them very differently.  We treat 4(t-the  pro- 
portionality  factor between  "ideas  used"  and  citations-as  a pure nui- 
sance  parameter,  because  the citations  process  holds  no interest  for us 
other  than  as a window  on  the  spillover  process.  We need  to allow  + 
to vary over t because  citations per patent have been rising rapidly, and 
there are good  reasons  to believe  that institutional  changes  are the rea- 
son.  On the other hand,  8s is a key model  parameter; its variation over 
time  captures  changes  in  the  potency  of knowledge  spillovers.  As  al- 
ready  mentioned,  we  find  a  significant  fall in  this  potency  over  the 
century,  and  associate  this fall with  the observed  reduced  productivity 
of private research. 
It is,  of course,  crucial for identification  that we  do not have  parame- 
ters  8t and  bs, or  8st  and  (bst. That  is,  we  do  not  allow  the  potency 
of  spillovers  to  depend  on  the  receiving  cohort,  we  do  not  allow  the 
proportionality  factor between  citations  and  "ideas used"  to vary with 
the cited or "used"  cohort,  and we  do not allow  "interaction terms" in 
either.  Each of these  restrictions  requires  comment.  By not  allowing  8 
to vary  over  t or st,  we  are saying  that new-invention  cohorts  do  not 
vary  in  their ability  to  use  the  knowledge  of  the  past,  and  that  the 
potency  of a given  historic cohort in generating  spillovers  is a once-and- 
for-all attribute that does  not vary over the succeeding  cohorts.  In other 
words,  today's  inventors  may  have  available  to  them  more  or  less 
knowledge  than  was  available  to  yesterday's  inventors,  but  there  is 
nothing  intrinsic  about  the  nature  of  today's  inventions  or inventive 
process  that makes  previous  knowledge  more or less  useful  to today's 
inventors  than  yesterday's  knowledge  was  to  yesterday's  inventors. 
Further,  (holding  obsolescence  constant)  the  potency  of,  e.g.,  1920 in- 
29. Equivalently,  we  can estimate  pN but not N. 
30. To see  this,  it is important  to understand  that 15 and  t  are not different  parameters; 
for any given  year we  have  the  same  "propensity  to patent" whether  we  are looking 
at that year as a citing  or cited year. 38 ? CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
ventions  for facilitating  new  inventions  was  the  same  in  1960 as  it is 
today.  In our model,  in which  quality is a unidimensional  attribute so 
that  the  "nature"  of  inventions  never  really  changes,  these  seem  like 
natural  restrictions.  In  a  richer  model,  in  which  there  were  multiple 
quality dimensions,  then  one might  imagine  that the focus of invention 
today  might  be  more  or less  similar  to that  of  1920 than  the  focus  of 
invention  was  in 1960, suggesting  that potency  would  vary with  t and/ 
or st.  Of course,  to the  extent  that variations  in citation practices make 
it necessary  to allow  for variations  in  )t, it is not  clear how  variations 
in 8 across t could  be identified. 
The  restriction  on  <,  although  not  empty,  seems  more  innocuous. 
What we  are saying  is that the  "propensity  to cite" past  patents  does 
not vary over the different  historic cohorts,  and that patent office prac- 
tices  may  change  over  time,  and  this  may  change  the  number  of cita- 
tions  (holding  spillovers  constant),  but that these  changes  do not affect 
past cohorts differentially.  Both of these  propositions  seem to be consis- 
tent  with  our  impressions  of  the  examining  process.  The  biggest 
changes  have  been  computerization  of the  patent  data base,  allowing 
on-line  text  searches  to  facilitate identification  of citations,  changes  in 
the  procedures  for bringing  citations  to  the  examiners'  attention  that 
have  made  it easier  to include  citations  in the patent  document,  and a 
perceived  increase  in the enforcement  of the legal obligation  on inven- 
tors to disclose  knowledge  of prior art.31 
A fourth observation  of Equation (13) relates to the way the parameter 
t--number  of ideas per patent over time-enters  the equation.  Because 
the  flow  of new  ideas  is not  observed,  any attempt  to pin down  varia- 
tions  in  the  propensity  to  patent  requires  having  a  second  indicator 
(besides  the rate of patenting)  of the rate of knowledge  generation.32 In 
this  case,  our  second  indicator  is  the  rate of  decline  in the  citation  of 
old  knowledge.  That  is,  if  the  patents  during  some  historical  period 
were  unusually  large,  in the  sense  of incorporating  many  ideas in each 
patent,  then  they  should  have  made  previous  knowledge  obsolete  to a 
greater extent  than would  be expected  based  on the number of patents. 
This will  be  reflected  in  the  data in  the  form of a reduced  number  of 
citations to these  previous  periods.  Of course,  a period with larger than 
average  patents  would  also  receive  more  citations  itself,  and  that  is 
captured by the presence  of  is  in front of the exponential.33 Because of 
31.  Personal  communication,  Jane Meyers,  U.S.  Patent Office. 
32.  See Pakes and Griliches  (1984). 
33. Similarly, if a period's  patents  are bigger  than average,  they will make  more citations; 
this is captured  by the presence  of  it out front. Knowledge  Spillovers  and Creative  Destruction ? 39 
the  presence  of the  8 and  4  parameters,  however,  this effect  probably 
contributes  less  to the estimation  of the t4s than the exponential  term.34 
Thus, the model  has two distinct parameters that relate to the average 
"importance,"  broadly  speaking,  of  patents  of  a  given  cohort.35 The 
variation  over  time  in the  parameter 4 captures  any  differences  in the 
number  of  new  ideas  embedded  in  the  average  patent.  The variation 
over time in the parameter 8 captures variations in the potency  (in terms 
of spillover  generation)  of the ideas  themselves. 
Finally,  we  note  that the diffusion  of knowledge  is assumed  to occur 
at a rate that is measured  in time rather than  elapsed  inventions.  This 
seems  natural.  It is less  obvious  that the diffusion  parameter y need  be 
constant  over  time,  but we  did not explore  its variation. 
We  estimated  variations  of  Equation  (13) by nonlinear  least  squares 
on  the  set  of  observations  consisting  of  (s,  t) pairs with  t varying  be- 
tween  1975 and  1992 and  s varying  between  1900 and  t.36 Although  a 
model  in which  all of the bs and ijs are allowed  to vary over all s and t 
is identified  in principle,  we  did not attempt  to estimate  it. Rather, we 
followed  a  strategy  of  (1) always  allowing  a full  set  of  multiplicative 
constants  (t,  to control  for changes  in citation  practices,  and  (2) using 
a combination  of  dummies  over  longer  time  periods  and  polynomial 
functions  of time to capture variations  in both  8 and  J over time. 
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  2.  The  first  column  shows  the 
simplest  model  one  could  imagine  estimating,  in which  we  ignore  the 
"two clocks" and estimate  both diffusion  and depreciation  off of the lag 
in  years  between  s  and  t.  Not  surprisingly  (having  seen  Fig.  1),  this 
model  fits the  data reasonably  well.  We get  an estimate  for y of about 
.8, and  an estimate  for the  "obsolescence"  rate of about  .075 per year. 
As would  be expected  from the rising average citations made per patent 
shown  in Table 1, the  estimates  of (t  rise from 1975 to 1992. This is a 
result that is apparent  in all specifications.  Next,  we  substitute  elapsed 
patents  for time  in  the  depreciation  term,  while  still maintaining  con- 
34. If we estimated the model with a free and complete set of the parameters  85, there 
would be no contribution  to the estimation  of the time pattern  of  i  from its presence 
out front. Because,  however, we constrain  the bs  to follow particular  functional  forms, 
this is not the case. 
35. Note that the "size"  of ideas themselves, in terms  of the product  quality  improvement 
they allow, does not vary except in the specific  way defined by the exponential  form 
in which q enters the aggregate  consumption  good (Equation  (2)). 
36. Because the a*(t, s) are estimated and the frequencies differ greatly, the model is 
heteroskedastic.  We did not deal with this problem  explicitly,  but dropping  the early 
observations  can be interpreted  as limiting  ourselves to that part  of the data in which 
the heteroskedasticity  is likely to be less. The standard errors reported are hetero- 
skedasticity  consistent, however. 40 * CABALLERO & JAFFE 
Table 2  CITATION FUNCTION  REGRESSION RESULTS 
Parameter  1  2  3  4 
ry  .816  .703  0.707  0.705 
(.019)  (.015)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
.074  .062  a  a 
(.001)  (.001) 
41975  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
(41992  1.244  1.444  1.495  2.066 
(.028)  (.027)  (0.012)  (0.021) 
MSE  0.184  0.130  0.124  0.122 
2 (LLK-LLKpc)  -537.6  70.6  15.0 
Notes: Dependent  variable: Sample  citations  from year  t to year s/((Sample  patents)t-(total  patents)s). 
Sample:  t from 1975 to 1992; s from 1900 to t. 
"See Figure 2. 
Estimates  of  )1976  -  01991  are omitted  to conserve  space.  (LLK-LLKpc):  log-likelihood  minus  the log- 
likelihood  of the previous  column. 
stancy  over  time in bs and  4s. To facilitate interpretation  of the results, 
we  use  for the terms in the  summation  in Equation (13) the number  of 
patents  in  each  year  divided  by  the  average  (over  the  whole  sample, 
1900-1992)  number  of  patents  per  year.  This  makes  the  parameter  in 
front of the  term  (Nt -  Ns) the  average  annual  obsolescence  rate; it is 
therefore directly comparable to the time-obsolescence  rate estimated  in 
Column  1. Estimating  obsolescence  based  on  patents  rather than time 
improves  the fit markedly,37 and also reduces  the average obsolescence 
rate to just over 6% per year.  Because  the number  of patents  is greater 
in recent years,  the  observed  prevalence  of early citations  is consistent 
with  a lower  average  annual  obsolescence  rate than  when  the  rate is 
held  constant  over  time. 
The third column  of Table 2 "frees up" the parameter ij to vary over 
both  t and  s,  i.e.,  it  allows  for variations  in  the  propensity  to  patent 
over  time  (while  still  keeping  the  spillover  potency  of  ideas  constant 
over time).  Needless  to say, there are many  different ways  to represent 
the movement  in tit. We explored  a number of these,  and they generally 
give  similar overall results.  The version  reported  in Column  3 of Table 
2 models  /tt with  a  single  dummy  for the  years  1900-1919,  a second 
dummy  for 1920-1939,  a third dummy  for 1940-1959,  and a cubic equa- 
tion in the  log  of t for the  period  1960-1992.  This improves  the fit fur- 
ther,  and  the  parameter  estimates  are quite  significant.  The time  path 
of  4' implied  by  these  estimates  can  be  seen  in  Figure  3a.  Generally 
37. The sum  of squared  residuals  is reduced  by about 30%. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  41 
Figure 3a: t't 
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speaking,  the  path  rises  over  the century,  reaching  a peak somewhere 
during  the  1970s, and then  begins  to decline.  Again,  the  patent  counts 
have  been  divided  by the  average  patents  per year so  that  the  magni- 
tude  of  f can be interpreted  as the annual  rate of obsolescence  created 
by an average  year's worth  of patents.38 
Column  4 builds  on Column  3 by freeing up 8s. The parameterization 
of bs is  parallel  to  that for ts,  with  dummies  for long  periods  early in 
the  century  and  a cubic  equation  in  t for the  period  1960-1992.  This 
yields  a similar pattern for tit to what  we  had before,  except in the very 
beginning  of  the  century.  But  8s moves  significantly  in  the  opposite 
direction,  as shown  in Figure 3b, falling  significantly  from the  start of 
the century until about 1960, and then leveling  off into a slower decline. 
As we  will see later, the decline  in 8s shown  in Figure 3b translates into 
a secular  decline  in the  predicted  productivity  of research,  Ot. In other 
words,  knowledge  from  successive  patent  cohorts  over  the  century  is 
being  incorporated  in  current  patents  at rates  that imply  that the  po- 
tency of later cohorts  in facilitating new  knowledge  generation  is mark- 
38. The number of patents per year also changes over time, of course, causing the varia- 
tion in the yearly rate of obsolescence  to be much greater  than the variation  in ipt.  See 
Figure  4. 42 - CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
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edly  less  than  the  potency  of  earlier  cohorts.  Because  more  recent 
cohorts  get more weight  (they  are less  obsolete)  in current knowledge, 
the  predicted  effective  spillover  rate (and hence  research productivity) 
falls over the century.39 
As noted  earlier, the estimate  of the diffusion  parameter y is not very 
sensitive  to  these  specification  issues.  It is consistently  about  .7 to  .8, 
suggesting  an average lag until knowledge  has diffused  of between  one 
and two  years. 
For obsolescence,  it is  not  4t that  matters,  but  rather  itP,,  which  is 
equal  to N'' -=  .  Figure 4 shows  different  estimates  of N',  compared 
to the  overall  patent  series  itself.  What the  picture  shows  is that first, 
the  variations  in  ti  over  time  are  small  relative  to  the  movements  in 
patents.  Nonetheless,  the  "corrected"  series  does  show  a  noticeably 
different  pattern,  particularly at the beginning  of the century and from 
the  end  of World War II until  the  late  1970s.  In this  latter period,  our 
estimate  of N'  increases  almost  40% more than the patent  series  itself. 
After  the  early  1970s,  4Jt  begins  to decline,  exacerbating  the  fall in the 
39. One  manifestation  of this phenomenon  is the  presence  of fat tails in the distribution 
of  the  a*(t, s)'s.  This  is  not  enough,  however:  allowing  for  fat  tails  in  estimation 
improves  the  fit but it leaves-to  a large extent-unaffected  the declining  path of 85. 
0 
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rate of  patenting  itself  that  occurs  between  1970 and  the  early  1980s. 
Then patenting  picks up again,  and although  it is still falling,  N' picks 
up as well.  It in the next subsection,  we turn to a more detailed analysis 
of trends  in N' versus  trends  in patents. 
The  last  output  of  the  citations  analysis  is  the  construction  of  the 
series  Ot, our  estimate  of  the  productivity  of  labor in  research.  From 
Equation  (10), Ot  is the integral over all past ideas q of a(t, s(q)). We do 
not  observe  a(t,  s),  but  the  estimated  citation  equation  can be used  to 
construct  predicted  values  of a(t, s), using  the parameters  y, as, and 4's 
and the data series  Pt. This is easily  done  by replacing Equation (13) in 
(12). 
Our estimate  of  Ot  (up  to  a constant)  is then  easily  obtained  from a 
discrete representation  of the definition  of Ot:40 
ot  E  a(t,  s),sPs.  s=o 
In the  formulation  described  previously,  in which  %t  enters  the rela- 
tionship  between  a(t, s) and a*(t, s) but does  not affect a(t, s) itself,  the 
parameters  (t  do not enter into the construction  of a(t, s) or Ot.  We also 
explore a variation in which  we interpret the parameters ,t  as represent- 
ing  something  real about  the  use  of knowledge  rather than  a citation 
artifact. This will change  the estimated  path of Ot  after 1975. 
Two potential  estimates  of Ot  from the citation function  are plotted  in 
Figure 5. The solid  line  corresponds  to Column  4 of Table 2, in which 
as is allowed  to vary over time.  It shows  a dramatic fall in the predicted 
productivity  of  research  labor,  very  rapid from the  1950s to  the  early 
1970s, and then  somewhat  slower  than that.  The heavy  dashed  line in 
Figure 5 corresponds  to Column  2 of Table 2, i.e.,  it holds  8b  constant 
over  time.  It shows  a much  flatter pattern  of research productivity.  In 
the  next  subsection,  we  will  relate  the  estimated  Ot to  the  observed 
productivity  of research  in the  United  States.  For now,  it is important 
to  emphasize  that  this  time  series  is  not  generated  from  data  on  the 
productivity  of  research.  Rather,  it is  the  model's  prediction about  the 
path  of research  productivity,  based  on  the  pattern  of old  knowledge 
used,  as represented  by citations,  in the production  of new  knowledge. 
What is driving  the  trend  is the  path  of 6,.  In a nutshell,  the  citations 
data show  that recent  cohorts  of patents  are less  cited than older ones 
40. The fact that the summation starts from 0 rather than minus infinity is empirically 
irrelevant  because the first t we study is sufficiently large (60) so the value of the 
excluded a(t, s)N, is negligible. 44 * CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
Figure  5: THE STOCK  OF PUBLIC  KNOWLEDGE  (0) 
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(controlling  for obsolescence),  suggesting  that  they  are less  potent  in 
generating  spillovers.  Because  obsolescence  makes recent patents  more 
important  in  the  overall  stock,  the  current stock  is less  potent  overall 
than  the  stock  that  was  available  to  previous  inventors.  With  shorter 
shoulders  to  stand  on,  current inventors  have  to  spend  more  on  tele- 
scopes  in order to see  as far as their predecessors  did. 
Note  that the estimated  decline  in Ot  is conditional  on our assumption 
that the parameter 4t captures only citation behavior and not any change 
in the actual use  of old knowledge.  If, on the other hand,  one believed 
that the increase  in the raw citation rate that can be seen  in the data is 
a real (exogenous)  increase in the use of old knowledge,  then we would 
expect  this increase  to feed  through  into rising research productivity.  It 
seems  likely,  a priori,  that  the  large increase  in citation  intensities  re- 
flects  primarily  a change  in  citation  practices.  In addition,  as we  will 
show  later, actual research productivity  shows  no evidence  of increasing 
after 1975 as would  be predicted  if 0t were  rising steeply. 
3.3 THE  INNOVATION  PRODUCTION  FUNCTION 
Equation  (8) describes  the  production  of  innovations  as  a function  of 
the  research  labor force L[ and  a research  productivity  function  or pa- 
rameter Ot. In the previous  subsection  we  have developed  a method  for 
constructing  an  estimate  of  Ot based  on  the  "use,"  as  evidenced  by 
citations,  of older knowledge.  In this subsection  we will incorporate this Knowledge  Spillovers  and Creative  Destruction * 45 
estimate  into  estimates  of the  innovation  function  itself.41 We estimate 
the  innovation  function  on  aggregate  time  series  for patents  and  two 
measures  of  research  inputs-R&D  spending  and  research  scientists 
and  engineers-for  the  period  1957-1989.  If the  data  and  model  are 
interpreted  literally,  Equation  (8) leaves  large serially correlated distur- 
bances  unexplained.  One  possibility  is to correct for serial correlation, 
leaving  this  dynamic  pattern  in the  disturbance  unexplained.  Another 
possibility  is to modify  the  theory  so innovations  are a direct function 
of  current  and  lagged  research.  Doing  the  latter modifies  our  model 
only  slightly  if the  lagged  research  that  matters  is  the  aggregate  one, 
while  it makes  the  theory  more  cumbersome  if lagged  research  is pri- 
vate.  From  the  point  of  view  of  estimation  in  this  section,  however, 
this distinction  does  not matter. Moreover,  this common  specification  is 
indistinguishable  from a third explanation  where  the serially correlated 
disturbance  is attributed to the timing of research,  innovation,  and pat- 
enting.  We explain  and adopt  the latter, but it should  be clear that we 
have  no  strong  position  on  the  relative importance  of these  sources  of 
serial correlation. 
We will treat the fundamental  innovation  equation  (8) as holding  with 
respect  to  unobserved  new  ideas.  These  ideas  do  not,  however,  lead 
instantaneously  to  patent  applications.  Rather,  patent  applications  Pt 
are given  by: 
(1 -  p) 
tpt  =  pI;ob  =  1  pL  t 
Thus,  as previously,  we allow for a time-varying  propensity  to patent 
or proportionality  constant  between  ideas  and patents;  we  call this  it, 
and we  will  use  the  estimates  from the previous  subsection  to convert 
Pt to Ntb. In addition,  however,  we  allow  for lags  in the  conversion  of 
ideas  into  patent  applications.  We will  estimate  these  lags,  parameter- 
ized by p, from the innovation  function itself. We take the actual produc- 
tivity parameter,  0t, to depend  on the Ot  estimated  earlier and exogenous 
research productivity:  Ot =  q0 + -T10t. The parameters  q0o  and -1 will also 
be estimated  from the innovation  function. 
Note  that patents  are not actually granted until some  later date,  usu- 
ally within  two to three years of application but occasionally  much later. 
41. We will also use the estimates of 4t from the previous subsection  to convert patents 
to N'. Given the large inflow of foreign patents, this is likely to underestimate  the 
change in size of U.S. patents, for on average  there  will be more  inventions  in between 
subsequent U.S. patents. 46 . CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
Because  this  second  lag is variable and results  from the vagaries  of the 
patent office,  we estimate  the innovation  function using  patents by year 
of  application.42 This  is  in  contrast  to  our  construction  of  Ot, and  the 
knowledge  diffusion  analysis  more  generally,  which  used  patents  by 
grant year. This was predicated  on the assumption  that knowledge  does 
not  begin  to  spread  until  the  patent  is  actually  granted.  This  seems 
plausible,  because  patent applications  are secret.  Only when  the patent 
is  granted  is  the  technical  knowledge  contained  in  it  published.  We 
should  note,  however,  that we will look below  at the response  of firms' 
market value  to (ultimately  successful)  patent  applications.  We are im- 
plicitly assuming  that, at the time of application,  the market knows  that 
an  idea  has  been  generated,  and  responds  to  that  knowledge,  even 
though  its technical  content  is still secret. 
We estimate  the innovation  function  using  measures  of U.S.  research 
inputs,  and  a  measure  of  U.S.  patents.  Again,  this  differs  from  the 
previous  subsection  where,  though  we are using  "patents in the United 
States,"  we  include  patents  granted  in the  United  States  to foreigners 
in N.  This means  that,  in estimating  the relationship  between  U.S.  re- 
search and U.S.  patents,  we  include  in the spillover  function  Ot  all pat- 
ents,  not just  U.S.  patents.  Thus,  we  are assuming  that U.S.  research 
produces  U.S.  inventions,  but it draws upon  (and is made obsolete  by) 
worldwide  inventions. 
It is  well  known  that  the  productivity  of  research,  as  measured  by 
patent  output,  shows  a long-term  decline  from the 1950s until the mid- 
1980s (Griliches,  1989; Kortum,  1993). This is  shown  in Figure 6.  The 
top  panel  shows  the  ratio of  patents  to  several  measures  of  research 
input; the bottom panel plots N', i.e.,  4t times patents.  The patent series 
is  total  "U.S.  priority" patents,43 by  year  of application.  The research 
input measures  include  real nongovernment  R&D expenditures  and to- 
tal research  scientists  and engineers,  as well  as each of these  scaled by 
U.S.  population,44  and  nominal  R&D scaled  by  nominal  expenditure. 
Explanations  that  have  been  put  forward  for the  downward  trend  in 
patent  productivity  include  (1) an exogenous  fall in "technological  op- 
portunity,"  (2) aggregate  decreasing  returns  to  research,  producing  a 
fall in average productivity  because  research has risen significantly,  and 
(3) a decline  in the propensity  to patent  (Kortum, 1993). 
42. This is the  standard  practice in  the  patent  literature.  See,  e.g.,  Hausman,  Hall,  and 
Griliches (1984). 
43. This means  that the patent  was  applied  for in the United  States before being  applied 
for anywhere  else  in the world. 
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Our  estimates  from  the  previous  section  shed  significant  light  on 
these  issues.  First,  as  can  be  seen  from  Figure  6  (as  well  as  Fig.  4), 
correcting  for patent  size  using  the  estimated  /t  does  mitigate  the  fall 
in productivity  up  until  1970. Thereafter,  unfortunately,  the estimated 
/t begins  to fall, aggravating  the apparent  fall in productivity.  Our esti- 
mates for Ot  do, however,  provide an explanation  for much of the overall 
trend in patent  productivity.  This can be seen  from Figure 6, in which 
the estimated  Ot  is plotted  along with the observed  productivity.  In both 
panels,  it is  clear that  the  overall  downward  movement  in  Ot  is  quite 
consistent  with  the  fall in  research  productivity,  although  it does  not 
explain  the high-frequency  movements,  including  the precipitous  drop 
in the late 1970s and the rapid rise in very recent years.  In the terms of 
the  previously  offered  explanations  for the  fall in patent  productivity, 
our  estimates  suggest  that  "technological  opportunity"  has  indeed 
fallen.  In our model,  this takes the form of decreased  usefulness  of the 
stock  of  existing  knowledge  in  generating  new  ideas.45 The  previous 
section  shows  that this fall can be observed  in the pattern of actual use 
of older knowledge,  as evidenced  by patent  citations. 
Figure 6 suggests  that the estimated  0t explains  much of the observed 
trend  in patent  productivity.  To push  this a little further,  we  estimate 
the equation:46 
1N?b  =  o +  (1 
- 
p)0tRt  +  pNl;l, 
with  Rt a measure  of research input  and 
t  =  q0  +  Tl 0t 
The parameter estimates  are presented  in Table 3. The columns  corre- 
spond  to  different  measures  of  research  input.  In column  1,  we  use 
research  scientists  and  engineers.  The  fit is  quite  good,  and  the  esti- 
45. Note that the Ot  shown in Figure  6 is the one that results when we treat the increase 
in 4t as an artifact  of citation practices  rather  than a real phenomenon. On the one 
hand, the close correspondence  of the resulting Ot  to measured  productivity  provides 
further support to our conjecture  that the movements in 4t are not "real." On the 
other hand, if this is wrong and the "abnormal"  trend in citations  corresponds  to a 
true increase in spillovers, our measure of 0 exacerbates  rather  than eliminates the 
patent/R&D  ratio puzzle, at least until 1986. 
46. We also estimated versions allowing for decreasing  returns  with respect to research 
input. The standard specification  with decreasing  returns  but r  =  0 was uniformly 
and very significantly  outperformed  by the linear  model with rl unrestricted.  Adding 
decreasing returns to the model with m1  unrestricted  yielded unrealistically  low and 
very imprecise estimates of the returns  to scale parameter. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  *  49 
Table 3  INNOVATION  FUNCTION  RESULTS 
S-E  S-E/Pop.  R&D  R&D/C  R&D/Pop. 
Parameter  1  2  3  4  5 
OL  -0.012  -0.013  0.002  -0.009  -0.013 
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.062)  (0.007) 
p  0.953  0.934  0.887  0.912  0.934 
(0.069)  (0.062)  (0.076)  (0.074)  (0.062) 
'io  -0.380  0.002  -0.133  -0.042  0.028 
(0.134)  (0.056)  (0.133)  (0.052)  (0.056) 
m1  0.759  0.259  0.188  0.207  0.254 
(0.223)  (0.071)  (0.189)  (0.104)  (0.071) 
LLK  180.0  182.4  176.6  177.9  178.6 
Notes:  Dependent variable:  4t weighted aggregate  U.S. priority  patents  by year of application.  Sample: 
1958-1989. 
mates  are all reasonable  and  statistically  significant.  As  suggested  ear- 
lier,  Ot  is  highly  significant.  The  next  column  uses  research  scientists 
and  engineers  as a fraction of the population.  The fit is approximately 
the  same,  and the  role of Ot  is smaller but still positive  and significant. 
In the next three columns,  we report results for research input measured 
as real R&D expenditure,  and  R&D expenditure  divided  by consump- 
tion and population,  respectively.  Except for unscaled  R&D (where  the 
signs  are correct but the coefficients  are not  significant),  the results  are 
similar to those  obtained  with  scientists  and engineers. 
Thus,  the regression  results confirm what can be seen in the pictures, 
that  our  estimated  decline  in  Ot, inferred  from  patent  citations,  "ex- 
plains"  much  of the secular decline  in measured  patent productivity.  In 
interpreting  this,  we  must  consider  the  factors determining  the almost 
monotonic  decline  in  Ot through  our sample  period.  First, there  is the 
decline  in bs, indicating  a reduction  in the usefulness  of successive  co- 
horts of ideas  in generating  spillovers  to the creation of new  ideas.47 In 
principle,  there  is a second  force potentially  at work: Ot  is constructed 
using  all  patents,  not  just  U.S.  patents.  The  fraction  of  U.S.  patents 
going  to foreigners  rose from about  11% in 1957 to about 44 percent  in 
1989. From the point  of view  of U.S.  inventors,  this increase in foreign 
patenting  in  the  United  States  has  the  effect  of  speeding  up  the 
47. The empirical  regularity is that the  citations  to early patents  are more  frequent  than 
would  be expected  based  on the estimated  rate of exponential  obsolescence.  We inter- 
pret this in terms of s8 having  been  larger in the early years.  Alternatively,  one could 
say that the true obsolescence  function  is "slower"  than exponential,  i.e.,  the citation 
distributions  have  fatter tails than predicted  by exponential  obsolescence.  Either way, 
the  effect  is  similar;  we  would  predict  a  decline  in  the  effective  spillover  base  as 
knowledge  accumulates. 50 *  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
"N  clock"  without  affecting  the  "time  clock."  New  ideas  are coming 
faster in the aggregate,  making it harder for any inventor  to take a step, 
and  much  of  this  new  knowledge  is  too  recent  to  have  diffused  and 
thereby  spilled  over to helping  new  invention. 
The top panel  of Figure 7 shows  that it is actually only  the decline  in 
bs that mattered.  The  solid  line  shows  what  0t would  have  looked  like 
if 86 had  been  constant;  it is itself  quite  constant.  Figure 7 also  shows 
why  the increase  in N'  caused  by foreign patenting  did not matter: The 
rate of knowledge  diffusion  is fast enough  so  that the  spillovers  from 
this  influx  roughly  balanced  the  increased  obsolescence.  This  can  be 
seen  from  the  dashed  line,  which  shows  what  Ot  would  have  looked 
like if y were  much  smaller,  i.e.,  .001. In that case,  we  would  have had 
a marked  decline  in  Ot  even  if 8s had been  constant.  The bottom  panel 
reproduces  these  two cases for the actual (declining)  path of  ,. It shows 
that, if y had been  smaller,  there would  have been  an additional  down- 
ward  effort  on  productivity  from the  influx  of  foreign  patenting.  But, 
given  the actual y, this effect is small; diffusion  is close enough  to instan- 
taneous  that we  are, in effect,  in the  world  described  in Section  2.3 in 
which  Ot  does  not depend  on N. 
3.4 N AND GROWTH 
As shown  in Equation (21), the theoretical model  predicts an extremely 
simple  linear relationship  between  the growth  rate of consumption  and 
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N. Casual inspection of the data makes clear that such a relationship 
does not hold for annual data in the United States. The high-frequency 
movements in  these  series are not likely to be well explained by a 
growth model. Therefore, to explore whether we can find evidence of 
the predicted relationship, we smoothed both time series by using pre- 
dicted values from a regression of the actual  series on a fifth-order  poly- 
nominal in the log of time. The top panel of Figure 8 shows  the resulting 
smoothed consumption growth rate and N, using the same U.S. priority 
patent series, corrected  by the estimated 4i)  from the citation data. The 
shapes are strikingly similar, especially considering that it is not clear 
that one can expect consumption, as actually  measured in the National 
Income Accounts, to move as predicted by the model.48 
Given the  previous discussion,  it is  not  clear how  seriously one 
should take precise timing issues. For  completeness, however, we men- 
tion that the N series appears to be displaced forward by one or two 
48. The essence of technological  change in this model is the introduction  of new goods. 
As has been emphasized by Griliches (1979) and others, the extent to which the 
statistics  capture  the increase  in consumption  that occurs  when new goods are intro- 
duced varies greatly  across industries. The authorities  measure  revenues, not output, 
and convert revenues to output using price deflators  that generally  ignore the quality 
improvement  associated with new goods.  improvement  associated  with  new goods. 52 ?  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
years  up  until  the  early 1980s. This suggests  either that new  ideas  are 
incorporated in new products  even before the date of patent application, 
or, perhaps  more likely,  that both series are moved  by other shocks but 
exhibit different  dynamic  responses  to these. 
From Equations  (2) and  (4), it is possible  to write: 
_  ~  ~~~~-  -l/ot 
Ct=  {Lt(q)eq}adq 
Tit  oc  - 
but because 
Nt  NNt 
j  Lt(q)dq =  L  , 
and 
LU(q)  =  LP(Nt)e("/l1-,)(q-Nt), 
we  can express  the rate of growth  of consumption  as:49 
Ct  A  t 
-  +  N  t  -  t 
We estimated  the following  empirical version  of this equation: 
=  Ao  +  X1N; -  2A (?f).  (14) 
~,OtJ 
The coefficient  \2  was  never  significant,  so we  omit the last term in the 
regressions  reported below  in Table 4. Columns  1 and 2 present  results 
for the  growth  rate of consumption,  with  and without  a serial correla- 
tion  correction.  Columns  3  and  4  present  the  same  results  using  the 
growth  rate of labor productivity  instead  of consumption  as the depen- 
dent  variable.  All versions  tell a similar story.  The coefficient  on  N'  is 
about  .5 to  .6 and  significant.5 
The bottom  panel  of Figure  8 shows  the  (smoothed)  growth  rate of 
49. For this we  use  the approximation  A ln(1  -  x)  -  -x,  for x small. 
50. All  coefficients  appear  significant,  but  our transformation  introduces  large biases  in 
the standard errors, so these  should  not be taken too seriously.  Again, we only empha- 
size  the coincidence  in the general  shape  of the curves  in Figure 8. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  *  53 
Table 4  GROWTH  EQUATION  REGRESSION  RESULTS 
Parameter  1  2  3  4 
ko  -0.0092  -0.0098  -0.0248  -0.0311 
(0.0044)  (0.0032)  (0.0132)  (0.0083) 
XI  0.6121  0.5999  0.5162  0.5440 
(0.0629)  (0.0434)  (0.1872)  (0.1128) 
p  0.9037  -0.8993 
(0.042)  -  (0.0362) 
R2 
LLK  5.752  7.237  4.697  6.315 
Notes:  Dependent variable:  smoothed growth rate of U.S. consumption  expenditure.  Sample:  1958- 
1989. 
labor productivity  (GNP over employment),  and the  "true" N that can 
be derived  from Nob  using  the estimated  parameters from the innovation 
equation.  Again,  the movements  are very closely  related.  Although  we 
stress that the lag we have incorporated  between  the true and observed 
N is something  of a black box,  the  model  does  seem  to do  a good  job 
at predicting  the longer-term  movements  in the productivity  series. 
3.5 CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION 
All  of  the  previous  empirical  subsections  can be  thought  of  as condi- 
tional  on  the  path  of research.  In the  model,  the  allocation  of labor to 
research  is  determined  by  the  value  of  new  ideas,  whose  time  path 
is  given  by  Equation  (5),  the  "creative  destruction"  equation.  In this 
subsection,  we  present  some  empirical estimates  of that equation. 
As noted  earlier, estimation  of this equation  requires confronting  the 
notion  of firms. It also requires identifying  the concept of sectors, which 
have  not  been  explicitly  described  in  the  models  but  whose  dynamic 
properties  can be easily understood  by extension  of the results from the 
single-sector  model.  We will treat firms as agglomerations  of blueprints, 
although  we  will not  seek  to explain why  any particular firm holds  the 
particular portfolio  of blueprints  that it does.51 We will assign  firms to 
sectors,  which  will be defined  as groups  of firms whose  research activi- 
ties have  historically  focused  on similar areas. With these  assumptions, 
we  can derive  a version  of the creative destruction  equation  that relates 
the deviations  from the sector mean  in firms' value  growth  rates to the 
deviations  from the mean  of the firms' N. 
51. Although  this definition  of firms is consistent  with  the nonexcludability  of knowledge 
implicit  in  the  model,  it is unlikely  to hold  true in  reality.  In other  words,  research 
know-how,  organizational  capital,  and  other  forms  of  private  knowledge  must  add 
value  to a firm beyond  the value  of its patents. 54 * CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
Let Fit,, It and Is represent  the value  of a firm i in sector s, the value 
of the  entire  sector,  and  the  value  of  the  firms in  sector s that are in- 
cluded  in  the  sample;  all  of  them  at  time  t and  in  terms  of  units  of 
consumption.  Letting  Ai(q) and  (Ot(q) be indicator functions,  we  have: 
Nts 
Fits =  At(q)Vt(q)dq, 
rNts 
Is  t-  (9)  Vt(9)dq, 
Nts 
Its-  J  Vt(q) dq 
Differentiating  these  expressions  with  respect  to time,  using  Equation 
(5), letting  Nits  Ai(Nts)Nts, and  assuming  wts(q)  ots, we  obtain  our 
basic estimating  equation:52 
Is  Fit_.s 
Fits -  Ist  s  ~  s  Nt  (15) 
its  _  ts  _ 
where 
ts o= 
--  ts Ots 
We estimate  Equation  (15) on an unbalanced  panel  of firms from the 
NBER R&D panel (Hall et al., 1988), which contains Compustat  financial 
information  and  U.S.  patent  data.  The  assignment  of  these  firms  to 
technological  sectors is described  in Jaffe (1986). Briefly, the distribution 
of the firms' patents  across patent classes  for the period  1965-1972  was 
used  in a multinomial  clustering  algorithm  to identify  groups  of firms 
with  "similar" patent  class distributions.  The 567 firms are assigned  to 
a total  of  21  sectors.  Simple  statistics  for the  sectors  are presented  in 
Table 5. In general  the level  of aggregation  of the sectors is comparable 
52. An alternative  derivation  of the same equation  can be obtained  by letting  At(Nts)  be a 
random  variable  independent  across  i,  so  the  best  predictor  of its  realization  is  the 
share  of  the  firm's  value  in  the  industry.  Also,  if  one  assumes  that  each  sector  is 
comprised  of a large number of firms, the total number of new  patents in the industry 
together  with  its  change  in  value  can  be  taken  as  known  in  advance  (or at  least 
uncertainty  about these  can be assumed  to be negligible  relative to the same concepts 
at the firm level). Table 5  STATISTICS FOR CREATIVE DESTRUCTION SAMPLE FIRMS 
Firm 
Average  patents  Average 
Average  growth  times  estimated 
Number  Total  Average  patents  rate  sectorl  Average  Average  rate of 
of  obser-  firm  per  of  firm  sector  sector  creative 
Sector  firms  vations  value  firm  value  value  value  patents  destruction 
1  30  441  542.23  5.7642  0.04455  352.45  14735.46  167.02  0.0145 
2  44  684  2351.03  67.0877  0.0743  3768.71  96900.08  2889.46  0.0318 
3  16  226  4070.11  78.0487  0.03546  4622.25  57903.42  1141.43  0.0129 
4  21  318  2652.53  45.1792  0.05299  1123.76  49921.29  907.29  0.2511 
5  16  239  706.93  16.841  0.05748  337.34  9956.7  255.97  0.0304 
6  20  303  8224.99  79.8119  0.05127  5477.57  146432.80  1544.65  0.0018 
7  24  341  208.75  5.0469  0.07579  143.5  4158.79  112.46  0.0411 
8  21  326  4530.83  58.7791  0.14140  3378.6  88065.11  1209.72  -0.0012 
9  33  489  1286.94  54.1984  0.09234  2063.89  38265.89  1708.56  0.1313 
10  27  418  1607.58  57.2847  0.12077  2159.74  39483.43  1508.15  0.0693 
11  27  393  1147.94  34.916  0.02499  1349.37  27557.81  877.26  0.0246 
12  34  511  1071.48  6.3053  0.03260  226.17  32952.44  205.77  0.0115 
13  31  451  502.24  14.6386  0.08774  695.64  13135.86  418.41  0.0056 
14  13  200  1726.71  15.34  0.08214  475.53  20197.74  195.03  0.0065 
15  33  493  1333.17  16.7728  0.04794  872.42  39768.57  525.17  0.0105 
16  23  342  547.36  9.462  0.07767  518.28  11241.32  207.74  0.0205 
17  49  757  2145.09  41.749  0.06716  3995.33  99554.18  2018.69  0.0205 
18  24  339  587.77  9.6962  0.04060  285.85  11881.87  208.21  0.0084 
19  29  425  751.29  12.4965  0.05136  931.02  19417.10  346.84  0.0101 
20  27  393  300.32  3.4122  0.10359  318.63  6767.87  85.57  0.0152 
21  25  368  632.95  15.9484  0.05136  653.64  13540.95  375.9  0.0297 
All sectors  567  8,457  1658.93  31.3948  0.06210  1712.52  43774.37  940.05  0.0355 
Notes: Sectors: 1. Adhesives  and coatings;  2. Chemicals;  3. Electrochemistry;  4. Drugs;  5. Cleaning  and abrading;  6.  Petroleum  and refining;  7. Machinery 
(non-elec.);  8. Computers  and data processing;  9. Electrical equipment;  10. Electronic communications;  11. Stone,  clay, and glass; 12. Food; 13. Instruments; 
14. Medical; 15. Primary metals;  16. Misc.  consumer  goods;  17. Automotive;  18. Paper and  packaging;  19. Refrig.  and  heat exch.;  20. Static structures;  21. 
Farm and construction  equipment. 56 ?  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
to two- to three-digit  SIC industries.  The assignment  is made,  however, 
on the basis  of areas of inventive  activity rather than sales. 
To estimate  Equation  (15), we  need  to parameterize  the  variation in 
the  parameter  s,t  over  s and  t. This parameter encompasses  variations 
in the  CES parameter  a,  in the  share  of the  sector represented  by the 
firms  in  the  sample,  and  also  variations  in  the  proportionality  factor 
between  patents  and  new  ideas.  We treat it as the product  of a sector- 
specific  constant  and  a cubic  polynominal  in  t.  We  constrain  k to be 
positive  by using  an exponential  time polynomial.53 Although  Equation 
(13) implies  that  the  two  terms  in  square  brackets  are constrained  to 
have  the  same  coefficient  kst, we  allow  a free parameter on  the  sector 
patent  total Nts. We  also  allow  for year- and  sector-specific  intercepts, 
leading  to the equation  actually estimated: 
s 
Fits  -  ts =  ots +  tXs  Nit  - 
t  ,  (16) 
Fits  _ 
The results  of estimating  this equation  on 8,457 observations  are pre- 
sented  in  Table 6.  The  coefficients  Xs are generally  positive,  although 
many  are not  significant.54 The parameter  ,,  which  should  be unity  if 
the  proportionality  (implied  by  the  model)  between  value  and  patents 
holds,  is  about  1.4.  This  says  that  firm patents  scaled  by  the  ratio of 
firm to sector value  averages  less  than sector patents.  This is consistent 
with  the general  and intuitive  finding  that large firms have proportion- 
ally fewer  patents  than  small firms.55 The parameters  P1, P2, and P3 in 
the table are the coefficients  of the cubic time polynomial  for Xt. 
To interpret these  results,  we use the parameter estimates  to calculate 
rates of creative  destruction.  The most  straightforward  way  to do  this 
is to multiply  the estimated  Xst  times  the estimated  ,L times the number 
of patents  in the  sector in each year.  Doing  this yields  estimates  of the 
rate  of  creative  destruction  by  sector  by  year.  The  average  over  the 
sample years of these  numbers  are presented  in the last column of Table 
5. They  range  from essentially  zero  for a number  of sectors,  including 
computers,  to a high  of 25% per year for drugs.  The (unweighted)  aver- 
age  across  all  sectors  is  about  3.5% per  year.  Some  aspects  of  these 
results  are quite  consistent  with  previous  findings.  In particular,  the 
53. If we do not constrain  these estimates to be positive, we obtain negative estimates  at 
the end of the sample, although these are insignificant.  The overall  fit was statistically 
unaffected  by our nonnegativity  constraint. 
54. The time and sector intercepts  are not generally  significant. 
55. See, e.g., Bound et al. (1984). Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  57 
very  high  rate of  creative  destruction  for drugs  is consistent  with  the 
general  view  that  this  is  a very  progressive  sector  and one  in  which 
patents  are a very good  measure  of technical advance  (Mansfield,  1985; 
Levin  et  al.,  1987). We  also  find  relatively  fast creative  destruction  as 
measured  by patents  in machinery,  electrical equipment,  and communi- 
cations  equipment.  These  are all sectors  where  patents  are reasonably 
important.  In contrast,  our inability to find creative destruction  in com- 
puters is probably related to the relative unimportance  of patents in that 
sector  (Bound  et al.,  1984; Levin et al.,  1987), rather than a low  rate of 
technological  change. 
We can also look at variations  over time.  Again,  the most straightfor- 
ward way  to do this is to simply  multiply  the estimated  ,st  and  pu times 
Table  6  CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION  REGRESSION  RESULTS 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard  error 
p.  1.383  .245 
K1  .318  .185 
K2  .037  .025 
\3  .040  .019 
k4  1.034  .297 
k5  .425  .420 
k6  .004  .009 
k7  1.397  .767 
k8  -.003  .030 
k9  .283  .089 
Kio  .157  .046 
hll  .098  .060 
X12  .187  .238 
X13  .045  .087 
X14  .135  .178 
h15  .072  .071 
K16  .376  .177 
K17  .038  .018 
X18  .146  .271 
K19  .108  .063 
K20  .695  .249 
K21  .316  .158 
P1  -  .808  .206 
P2  .113  .034 
P3  -  .0048  .0016 
R2  =  .0366 
MSE  =  .1612 
Notes:  Dependent variable:  firm value growth rate minus sector value growth rate. Sample:  8,457 
observations  on 567 firms, 1966-1981. 58 * CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
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the yearly sectoral patent  total. If we  do this,  and average over sectors, 
we  get the path shown  in Figure 9. Beginning  at a high  of about 7% in 
1965, creative destruction  falls quickly into the range of 3-4%,  and then 
falls  close  to  zero  at the  end  of  the  sample  period  in  1981. There  is, 
however,  reason  not to take the time variation in total patents  in these 
data too seriously.  First, it is affected by the changing  firm composition 
in  the  unbalanced  panel.  In addition,  total patents  in this  sample  fell 
precipitously  in  1980 and  1981, because  of  the  way  the  data  set  was 
created.-6  For these  reasons,  the very low rates at the end of the sample 
period  should  probably be ignored. 
4. General  Equilibrium,  Calibration,  and Implications  of the 
Empirical  Results 
In the previous  section we  used  the basic structure of the growth model 
presented  in Section  2 to guide  our search for empirical manifestations 
of creative destruction  and knowledge  spillovers.  In this section  we  go 
back to the model  itself and examine  its properties,  using  the estimates 
56.  Recall that the data is patents  by year of application.  Because the data set was created 
in 1982, some  ultimately  successful  applications  from 1980 and 1981 had not yet been 
granted,  leading  to a systematic  undercount  in those  years. 
O  \ 
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obtained  in the empirical section  for the parameter values.  The primary 
purpose  of this  section  is simply  to explore  the  static and dynamic  be- 
havior  of  the  model  using  reasonable  parameter values.  We will  also, 
however,  go a little further and examine  some  strong positive  and nor- 
mative  conjectures  that arise from the behavior of the model  when  cali- 
brated with  the empirical parameter values. 
In Section 2 we  identified  the following  key parameters: p, a,  8, L, y, 
and P. Section 3 provides  estimates  of ac,  y, and P, as well as of changes 
in 8 (but not its level) and in a over time. Initially, we focus our attention 
on  the  average  value  of  the  parameters,  and  postpone  the  discussion 
of  the  impact  of changes  in  parameters  until  later in  this  section.  We 
set  the  discount  rate,  p, to  0.03,57 and  use  average  U.S.  consumption 
growth  together  with  the steady  state of the model  to calibrate 8 and L. 
In order to calibrate these  parameters,  we  first need  to go back to the 
model  itself  and characterize its equilibrium. 
The dynamical  system  that emerges  from the model  described in Sec- 
tion 2 has  a range  of parameters  for which  innovation  is unprofitable, 
so growth  does  not occur. We focus our analysis on cases where  steady- 
state growth  is strictly positive. 
From  the  innovation  function,  labor  market  equilibrium  and  free- 
entry conditions,  we  obtain an expression  for the rate of innovation  as 
a function  of the  productivity  of labor in research  and  of the  value  of 
the leading  idea in units  of consumption: 
t =  tL -  (17) 
Vt. 
Replacing this in the valuation  equation  (5) yields  the dynamic equation 
for Vt as a function  of itself and  Ot: 
t(P  + 1  tL)  Vt  a  (18) 
Finally,  the  dynamic  equation  for labor productivity  in research is ob- 
tained by differentiating  Equation  (10) with  respect  to time: 
et=  (  - 
ot) 
-  pNt, 
57. Quantitative  conclusions  are not  affected  by  other  "reasonable"  assumptions  about 
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which  combined  with  Equation  (17) yields: 
O 
yt=y(  - o)  -Potr-  t).  (19) 
Equations  (18) and  (19),  together  with  initial  conditions  on  0 and  a 
transversality  condition,  form a self-contained  dynamical  system.  After 
solving  for the paths of 0t and Vt from this system,  the rate of innovation 
can be recovered  from Equation (17). 
Because  we  found  large values  of *y-i.e.,  a high  speed  of diffusion 
of ideas-in  the  previous  section,  it is convenient  to first characterize 
the case where  diffusion  is infinitely  fast; this is a good  approximation, 
and  it has  the  advantage  of an extremely  simple  set  of dynamic  equa- 
tions. 
If there are no lags in the diffusion  of knowledge,  the system  has no 
transitional  dynamics.58 As  shown  in  Section  2,  in this  case  Ot =  8/P; 
which  by Equation  (18) and the transversality  condition  implies: 
U_  1 
V=  x 
1I  -  a  oc8 
1-a1p 
while  the rate of innovation  is: 
=  -)  --p\  (20) 
and consumption  growth  is: 
Ct  =  N  +  it,.  (21) 
These  expressions  provide  a  simple  setup  to  understand  the  main 
role of a,  8,  p,  and  p in determining  the  equilibrium  valuation  of new 
ideas,  knowledge  spillovers,  and the economy's  rate of growth:59 
58. Obviously,  anticipated  changes  will  lead  to non-steady  state dynamics.  The absence 
of  transitional  dynamics  refers  to  the  response  of  the  system  to  a  once-and-for-all 
unexpected  change  in a constant  of the model. 
59. One  could  also  study  the impact of L, but we  take this as a nuisance  parameter. It is 
at best  unclear which  is the appropriate  normalization. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  61 
aVpV2  ap  T  a (II  _  I;J 
-a-=  (x2  0at  1-c  1-a  1-a 
av  av  Lv2  daN  aN  (1 -  ot)L 
V  =  -  V  =  _-  < 0;  =  -  > 0,  (22b)  66  pdp  a  d  pdp  P 
a'V  _(1  - a)V2  aI/ 
a=-  < 0; a=  -(1  -  t) < 0.  (22c) 
dp  ta  ap 
When  the degree  of substitutability  among  goods  (a) rises,  the value 
(per unit of consumption)  of a new  idea rises. This may seem  surprising 
because  an  increase  in  a  lowers  the  markup  charged  by  firms.  There 
are, however,  three other effects  that must be considered.  First, as dis- 
cussed  in Section 2, the fall in the markup is outweighed  by an increase 
in  the  size  of  the  market  faced  by  new  ideas  (the  "scope  effect"),  so 
that the initial profit of the newest  idea rises with a. Second,  an increase 
in  ax  raises  creative  destruction,  which  reduces  expected  future  profits 
and,  hence,  the initial value  of ideas.  Third, it can be shown  that from 
these  effects  alone,  the ratio of the value to the wage  would  fall.60  From 
the free-entry condition,  this would  be inconsistent  with positive  inven- 
tion.  Therefore,  there  must  be  an  endogenous  decline  in  creative  de- 
struction (fall in N) in order to offset the fall in the value to wage  ratio.61 
The impact  of an increase  in the  potency  of spillovers  (8) as well  as 
that of a reduction  in the technological  destructiveness  of new  ideas  (p) 
is shown  in Equation  (22b). They increase  the pace of innovation,  and 
through  the impact of this on creative destruction,  lower the equilibrium 
value  of new  ideas.62 Finally,  Equation  (22c) shows  that an increase  in 
consumers'  impatience,  p, lowers  both  the value  of new  ideas  and  the 
rate  of  invention  through  standard  discounting  and  savings  mecha- 
nisms. 
Although  the  intuition  as well  as the  sign  of the  relations  described 
60. An important  mechanism  behind the monotonic relation  between growth and mark- 
ups is that labor supply is completely  inelastic. If this assumption is relaxed, then as 
the wage falls (i.e., markups  rise), there would be a reduction  in resources  available 
and, under the appropriate  functional  assumptions,  an eventual  decline  in equilibrium 
growth. 
61. In the y finite case, the endogenous decline in creative  destruction  would not com- 
pletely offset the initial decline in the value to wage ratio. 
62. Alternatively,  the fall in equilibrium  value can be explained in terms of the increase 
in the productivity  of research. This and the creative destruction  interpretations  of 
the decline in value are related  in equilibrium  by the free-entry  condition. 62 ?  CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
earlier  survive  the  introduction  of  a  finite  y,63 it  is  worth  describing 
briefly the implications  of frictions in the diffusion  of ideas. 
If y is finite,  the  system  exhibits  transitional  dynamics  because  "the 
clocks  have  to  synchronize  to  the  new  pace."  That is,  if information 
diffuses  slowly,  "shocks"  that lead to changes  in N disrupt the balance 
between  technological  obsolescence  and increases  in the base of knowl- 
edge.  Transitional dynamics  occur while  the new  level of 0 that restores 
this  balance  is  reached.  Before  discussing  dynamics,  however,  it  is 
worth  pausing  to study  the  steady  state and to calibrate the remaining 
parameters  using  average  U.S.  growth  data. 
The steady  state can be found  in closed  form, although  the equations 
are somewhat  less  informative  than before: 
0  p(  -  a){  -  /  +  /(p(l  -  at)  -  /)2 +  48-/L(1  -  a)2 
2(1  -  a)L  (23a) 
= 
V(p(l  -  o)p  -  /)2 + 48/L(1  -  a)  -  p(l  -  ta)  -  (23b) 
2P 
and 
a  1  V=  x  1 
(23c) 
1 - ot 
It is  apparent  from  these  equations  that using  average  growth  data 
only  (which  we  do here),  it is neither  possible  nor relevant  to separate 
L from 8; thus  we  set L =  1. We can now  recover all the parameters of 
the model.  We obtained  y =  0.7 directly from the citation function,  and 
p  =  1.67 is the inverse  of the  coefficient  on  the change  in the number 
of ideas,  as normalized  in the citation function,  in the growth  equation. 
We  recover  a  from  the  average  of  our  creative  destruction  estimates, 
0.035,  which  corresponds  to otN/(1 -  a),  and the average of N, 0.042.64 
The estimate  of a so obtained  is 0.463. The last parameter, 8, is obtained 
from the  steady-state  equilibrium  equation  for N (Equation 23b) and is 
equal to 0.199. 
63. This is particularly true for large values  of y, as is the one  estimated  in the empirical 
section. 
64. For this  we  use  that N4 =  /N',b/,,  and  N'ob  =  0.07.  Our sample  for the  estimate  of 
creative destruction  is 1965-1981,  while  we  use  the period  1960-1989  to compute  the 
average  change  in ideas. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  63 
Figure 10a plots the steady-growth  rate for an economy  with the same 
base  parameters  of  the  United  States  and  a range  of values  of  a,  the 
index  of  creative  destruction,  and  8,  the  spillover  potency  index,  that 
contain  the  U.S.  values.  Figure  10b does  the  same  for the  equilibrium 
value/consumption  ratio.  U.S.  "average"  equilibrium  is  depicted  by  a 
black dot in each  figure. 
One  of  our  main  empirical  findings  is  that  productivity  of  labor in 
research  has  declined  sharply  over  the  sample,  and  this  seems  to be 
mostly  due  to  a decline  in  8.  According  to  Figure  10a,  this  ought  to 
lower  the  equilibrium  rate of  innovation,  N,  and  raise  the  value  of  a 
new  patent  to consumption  ratio, V. On the other hand,  our empirical 
evidence  on  creative  destruction  suggests  that  a  has  decreased  over 
time; this  should  raise N and  V. 
Splitting the sample into two periods,  1960-1974 and 1975-1989,  asso- 
ciating the 1965-1974  and 1975-1981  averages  of creative destruction  to 
each  of these  periods,  respectively,65 we  can calculate the model's  pre- 
dicted  steady-state  changes  in N  and  V. We find that the effect  of the 
decline  in the power  of spillovers  dominates  the effect of the decline  in 
creative destruction  on equilibrium  growth,  leading  to a prediction  that 
N  should  have fallen by about 50% from the first to the second  periods. 
With  respect  to  value,  both  of  these  effects  go  in the  same  direction, 
leading  to a predicted  increase of about 25% in the value to consumption 
ratio. 
In reality, N (the patent  series adjusted  by our estimated  i) fell about 
15%. If we  proxy  the  value  to consumption  ratio by the  ratio of stock 
prices  to  nominal  consumption,  we  find  an  actual  rise  in  V of  about 
20%.66 Thus,  the  qualitative  predictions  of  the  model  are  confirmed, 
although  the  actual  magnitudes  changed  less  than  the  model  implies 
they  should  have. 
We conclude  this section  by briefly addressing  several issues  that are 
tangential  to  our  main  concerns:  (1) a  description  of  the  transitional 
dynamics  of the model,  (2) the long-run  effect of changes  in the speed 
of  diffusion  of  ideas  (y) and  in  technological  destructiveness  (1),  and 
(3) optimal  R&D subsidy  rates. 
Figure  11  shows  the  phase  diagram  corresponding  to  a  case  with 
65. Remember  that the sample used to estimate  the path of creative  destruction  goes from 
1965  to 1981  only. 
66. There  are several  reasons to think that an index of aggregate  stock prices  is not a great 
proxy for the value of patents. In particular,  the number  of patents a firm  has is likely 
to be an important  component of the value of its stock and, for the experiments  we 
discuss here, value and number  of patents at the firm  level are likely to be negatively 
correlated. 64 * CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
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Figure 11: PHASE  DIAGRAM 
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noninstantaneous  diffusion.  Point A corresponds  to a steady-state  equi- 
librium with  the  parameter  configuration  of  the  1960-1974  period  de- 
scribed earlier, while  point  B illustrates  the steady  state emerging  from 
the  1975-1989  period.  The thick line with  arrows illustrates  the saddle 
path of the new  equilibrium.  Because  in reality the shift in parameters 
may have  been  slow,  and the decline  in 6 seems  to have  compromised 
only  newer  cohorts,  it  seems  unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  actual 
dynamics  can be characterized in terms of the new  saddle path. Instead, 
a path  like the  one  depicted  by the  thin  line  with  arrows  seems  more 
likely.67 
Figure  12 illustrates  the  long-run  effect  of  changes  in  the  speed  of 
diffusion  of ideas  (y) and in technological  destructiveness  (P), with  the 
black dots representing  the steady state of an economy  with the parame- 
ter values  we  found  for the  United  States.  It shows  that y is large,  in 
the sense  that further increases  in it do not increase equilibrium growth 
significantly.  An  increase  in  the  destructiveness  parameter  P, by  low- 
ering the equilibrium  productivity  of labor in research,  reduces  equilib- 
rium growth  and raises the required value  of a new  idea. 
Finally,  we  address  the  optimal  subsidy  issue,  focusing  on  the  case 
where  -y  -  oc. We also assume  that the subsidy  to labor used  in research 
is  financed  with  a  tax  on  labor  used  in  production  of  consumption 
goods. 
Setting L =  at  =  1, and letting s be the subsidy  rate (in terms of units 
of consumption),  it can be shown  that in equilibrium,  N is: 
N = (1 
-)(  p  ))  (24) 
which  is  clearly  maximized  as s ->  1. As  always,  however,  there  is  a 
tradeoff between  long-run  growth  and current consumption.  Indeed: 
1/a 
l  -  ao  (oa  -  S)  a8  Nt 
a  ? (1 -s)  a  )- 
(25) 
which,  for given  Nt, is decreasing  with  respect  to s,  and  reaches  zero 
when  s  =  a.  Because  the  utility  function  is  logarithmic,  the  optimal 
subsidy  rate must  be less  than a. 
Because  we  have  assumed  that exogenous  technological  progress  is 
67. Note  that the initial jump  in 0 is possible  only  if the  initial change  in 8 involves  the 
potency  of older patents. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  67 
Figure 12a:  N 
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negligible,  we  have  that  Ct =  N,  so  we  can  write  the  present-value 
utility  of the representative  agent,  U0, as: 
U0 =  lnCo +  4. 
Maximizing  this  equation  with  respect  to  s,  subject  to  Equations  (24) 
and  (25), yields  the optimal  subsidy  rate, s*: 
-  a2(s8/  -  p) 
p +  a(8/pI  -  2p)' 
Replacing  the parameters calibrated in the previous  subsection  yields 
an optimal subsidy  rate of 33% if p =  0.03. If one turns back to Equation 
(24), such subsidy  rate almost doubles  the rate of growth  of an unsubsi- 
dized  economy  characterized  by  the  parameters  calibrated  for  the 
United  States.68 
5. Conclusion 
We have  constructed  a model  of economic  growth  through  the creation 
of  new  goods,  in  which  the  phenomena  of  creative  destruction  and 
knowledge  spillovers  play prominent  roles. The model has fairly simple 
and intuitive  relationships  between  the existing  public stock of knowl- 
edge  and  new  ideas,  between  new  ideas  and  growth,  and  between 
growth and the value of ideas or blueprints.  The model produces endog- 
enous  growth  for appropriate  parameter  values,  and  it highlights  the 
importance  of  the  speed  of  diffusion  of  existing  knowledge  and  the 
endogenous  rate of knowledge  obsolescence. 
We implemented  the  model  empirically  using  patents  as proxies  for 
new  ideas.  First, we  showed  that  it is  possible  to  use  patent  citation 
information  to  put  a fairly rich  structure  of  knowledge  diffusion  and 
knowledge  obsolescence  onto  the notion  of research spillovers.  We find 
that the  rate of  knowledge  obsolescence  rose  from about  2 or 3% per 
year  early  in  the  century  to  about  10-12%  per year  at the  end  of the 
1980s. Our results show  that the process  of knowledge  diffusion  is quite 
rapid,  indeed,  sufficiently  rapid that the model  performs essentially  as 
if diffusion  were  instantaneous.  In this  context  it is important  to note 
68. The optimal  subsidy  rate experiment  raises the issue  on whether  our calibration exer- 
cise should  be corrected to consider  the fact that in the United  States the subsidy  rate 
is nonzero.  We do not  think that the precise  numbers  should  be taken that literally. Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  69 
that  the  lag  we  are measuring  is  between  the  grant  date  of  the  cited 
patent and the grant date of the citing patent.  It seems  plausible to view 
diffusion  as beginning  with  the patent  grant, because  that is when  the 
patent  information  is public.  But the  grant date of the  citing patent  is, 
of course,  several  months  to a few  years after its application  date,  and 
we  take application  date as being associated  with invention.  Thus, from 
the  grant date  of  the  cited  patent  to  the  application  date  of  the  citing 
patent would  be even  a shorter lag. Our results on the speed  of diffusion 
seem  to  be  broadly  consistent  with  earlier work,  particularly  that  of 
Mansfield  (1985),  who  found  that  70% of  product  innovations  were 
known  and  understood  by  rivals within  12 months  of the  innovation, 
and only  17% took longer  than  18 months. 
This rapid diffusion  rate prevented  the large influx of foreign patent- 
ing  in  the  United  States  in  recent  decades  from  lowering  U.S.  R&D 
productivity  even  further: With diffusion  this rapid, the spillovers  from 
the  foreign  knowledge  creation  approximately  balance  the  increased 
rate of knowledge  obsolescence  that they  also create. 
This "good  news"  is overshadowed,  however,  by a measured  reduc- 
tion  in the  usefulness  of existing  public knowledge  in generating  new 
knowledge,  as  reflected  in  citation  patterns.  The  estimated  spillover 
potency  (8s) fell  by  a factor  of  5 over  the  century,  with  most  of  this 
occurring in the first few decades,  and a fall of about 25% in the postwar 
period.  When we translate this into the change  in effective  accumulated 
public  knowledge,  we  predict  a fall in  the  private  productivity  of  re- 
search inputs  of about 30% between  the late 1950s and  1990. 
We then  move  to the  estimation  of the  innovation  production  func- 
tion,  the  relationship  between  aggregate  U.S.  private  research  inputs 
and aggregate  U.S.  idea generation,  as represented  by U.S.  patents.  We 
confront  the  well-known  "puzzle"  of the  large fall in the  ratio of U.S. 
patents  to U.S.  research inputs  in the postwar period.  The citation func- 
tion  estimation  could,  potentially,  explain  this in two  ways.  If the  size 
of patents  was  increasing  fast enough,  then  the idea/research-input  ra- 
tio may not be falling even  if the patent/research-input  ratio is. Second, 
if the  effective  stock  of  public  knowledge  is  falling,  then  the  reduced 
spillovers  would  explain  the fall in the productivity  of private research 
inputs.  We find evidence  of both effects,  although  the increase in patent 
size peaks in the early 1970s, so that our ideas/research-input  ratio actu- 
ally falls faster than  the  patent/research-input  ratio after that.  For the 
entire  1958-1990  period,  we  can explain  the overall patent-productivity 
trend  quite  well,  but  we  do  not  explain  the  accelerated  decline  in re- 
search productivity  that occurred in the late 1970s, or the apparent  re- 
versal of the trend in the mid-1980s.  One difficulty with understanding 
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time  to be  cited,  so  our estimates  of both  8s and  i,  are very  imprecise 
for the  late  1980s.  Given  the  large increases  in the  number  of patents 
in  this  period,  it will  be  interesting  to  see  how  these  patents  fare as 
time goes  by. 
As  noted,  we  also  found  evidence  that  the  "size"  of  patents  has 
grown  over the century,  increasing  by a factor of 3 from 1900 until 1940, 
and  then  by  an  additional  20% until  it peaked  in  about  1970. This is 
consistent  with  previous  conjectures  about  changes  in  the  propensity 
to patent.  The early rise,  in particular, is probably traceable to changes 
in the  legal  treatment  of patents  and  the  "corporatization"  of research 
(see Schmookler,  1966). It may also be that innovation  has become  more 
"systems"  oriented  as it has become  increasingly  science-based,  so that 
each  "invention"  is actually  a larger and  larger package  of component 
ideas.  It is also interesting  that we  find the size  of patents  to be falling 
in recent years.  There were  two major institutional  changes  in the 1980s 
that  might  have  been  expected  to  affect  the  propensity  to  patent,  in 
opposite  directions.  First, patent  application  fees  were  increased,  and 
fees  for patent  renewal  were  instituted  for the  first time in the  United 
States  in  1981.  These  changes  should  have  operated  to  increase  the 
threshold  for inventors  to decide  to make a patent application,  reducing 
the  propensity  to  patent.  At  approximately  the  same  time,  there  has 
been  a perceived  increase  in the  strength  of patent  enforcement  in the 
United  States.  This  makes  patents  more  valuable  and  should  thereby 
increase  the  propensity  to  patent.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  latter 
effect may be empirically  more important.69 
Next  we  looked  at the  relationship  between  the rate of idea creation 
and consumption  or productivity  growth.  We showed  that, after remov- 
ing high-frequency  movements,  the growth  rates of either consumption 
or labor productivity  display  movements  over  the  last several  decades 
that correlate quite closely  with  the rate of invention  that we  measured. 
Thus,  in  our  model,  the  productivity  slowdown-the  long  fall in  the 
smoothed  growth  rate  of  productivity  from  the  mid-1960s-can  be 
traced back to a fall in the rate of new  product creation, which  itself can 
be  traced  to  a fall in  research  productivity  connected  to a decrease  in 
the potency  of old knowledge  in generating  new  ideas. 
The coincidence  in timing of the fall in patenting  in the 1970s and the 
slowdown  in aggregate  productivity  has been noted by others. We have 
a  story  consistent  with  those  facts,  but  we  cannot  push  it  too  hard 
because  so  many  of  our  assumptions  about  lags  between  observables 
and unobservables  cannot be tested. 
69. As can be seen from Figure  6, there has been a large increase  in the patent/research 
ratio in  the  late  1980s.  This would  also  suggest  a possible  rise in  the  propensity  to 
patent  (fall in the  size  of patents). Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  71 
Our final empirical innovation  is the measurement  of rates of creative 
destruction,  using  data  on  patents  and  value  at the  firm and  sectoral 
level.  Unfortunately,  these  estimates  can  only  be  made  for a  shorter 
time  period  in the  1960s and  1970s, because  the construction  of patent 
totals for these  firms in the 1980s has not been carried out. This exercise 
does  give  reasonable  estimates  for many  sectors,  varying between  0 for 
Petroleum  Refining  and 25% per year for Drugs,  with  a mean  of about 
3.5% per year.  The estimated  time  path of the average  rate of creative 
destruction  is  somewhat  surprising,  falling  from  a high  of  7% in  the 
mid-1960s  towards  zero by 1981. A challenge  for future work will be to 
try to find alternative  data series  that would  permit a richer analysis  of 
rates of creative destruction  by sector and over time. 
We  then  took  the  empirical  parameter  estimates  back to  the  model 
and  showed  that the  observed  decline  in the  productivity  of research 
has implications  for the innovation  rate, the growth  rate, and the value 
of new  ideas  that are all roughly  borne  out.  The model  simulation  also 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  apparently  rapid  diffusion  rate  of 
knowledge.  The  fact that  knowledge  diffuses  rapidly  prevented  what 
could  otherwise  have  been  an even  greater productivity  slowdown  in 
the  1970s and early 1980s. 
Stepping  back  from  particular  parameter  estimates  and  the  con- 
sistency  of  particular  model  blocks  with  observed  trends,  we  have 
suggested  an organizing  framework for empirical research on the contri- 
bution  of  industrial  innovation  to  aggregate  growth.  We  believe  that 
this  framework  offers  many  avenues  for fruitful future  work.  Having 
demonstrated  that the citation function works reasonably well,  it would 
be  interesting  to  go  back  to  it  and  focus  in  more  detail  on  issues  of 
stochastic  structure and identification.  Further, to really understand  the 
significance  and  interpretation  of the  observed  decline  in spillover  po- 
tency,  we  need  to look at the variations  across sectors  and  geographic 
space in the size of patents,  and in the diffusion  and obsolescence  rates. 
In principle,  one  could  categorize  citing patents  by technological  sector 
and by the national origin or U.S.  state of origination.  This would  allow 
one  to  put  a  finer  structure  on  our  homogenous,  public  good  called 
knowledge,  examining,  e.g.,  whether  foreigners  are slower  to pick up 
knowledge  in U.S.  patents  than are Americans.  One could also, to some 
extent,  examine  whether  knowledge  seems  to  have  a private  compo- 
nent,  by  looking  at whether  the  firm cites  its own  patents  more  often 
or more rapidly than it does  patents  owned  by other firms.70 
Consideration  of  cross-country  citation  patterns  suggests  that  more 
70. There is evidence,  e.g.,  that such  "self-citations"  are more prevalent  for private firms 
than  for universities,  and  that they  come  sooner  in time  than non-self-citations.  See 
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thought  needs  to be given  to how  to think about the rate of invention, 
the  rate  of  consumption  growth,  and  the  stock  of  public  knowledge 
in  an  open  economy.  We  have  modeled  U.S.  consumption  growth  as 
depending  on  U.S.  invention,  U.S.  invention  as  depending  on  U.S. 
research, but the "public" stock of knowledge  available to U.S. research- 
ers  as being  the  worldwide  stock.  With  respect  to  each  of  these,  our 
assumption  seems  superior  to the alternative  polar extreme,  but reality 
is probably  somewhere  between  the extremes. 
An interpretation  of the decline in  5s  is that research is steadily becom- 
ing  "narrower"  and,  hence,  generates  fewer  spillovers  because  each 
new  idea  is relevant  to a smaller  and  smaller set  of technological  con- 
cerns.  Empirical testing  of this  notion  would  necessitate  incorporating 
multiple  dimensions  of  product  quality  into  the  model,  so  that  there 
would  be a notion  of "technological  distance"  between  different inven- 
tions.71 This could perhaps be implemented  empirically using the patent 
classification information,72 although  the classification information is not 
available in computerized  form for patents  before the late 1960s. 
Finally,  it would  be interesting  to look at the connections  among  the 
private value  of particular inventions,  the creative destruction  they pro- 
duce,  and the knowledge  spillovers  they generate.  To some  extent,  one 
would  expect  that  important  patents  would  be  high  on  each  of  these 
scales,  but ideas  also probably vary in the magnitude  of both the nega- 
tive and positive  externalities  they  generate. 
REFERENCES 
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992).  A model of growth through creative  destruc- 
tion.  Econometrica  60:323-351. 
Bound, J., et al. (1984). Who does R&D  and who patents. In R&D, patents  and 
productivity,  Z. Griliches  (ed.), Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
Cockburn, lain, and Z. Griliches (1988). Industry effects and appropriability 
measures in the stock market's  valuation of R&D  and patents. American  Eco- 
nomic Review 78:420-423. 
Cohen, W. M., and S. Klepper (1992). A reprise of size and R&D. Mimeo, 
November. 
Evenson, R. (1991). Patent data by industry: Evidence for invention potential 
exhaustion?  In  Technology and Productivity, the Challenge  for Economic  Policy. 
Paris:  OECD. 
Gort, M., and S. Klepper  (1982).  Time paths in the diffusion of product  innova- 
tions.  The Economic  Journal  92:630-653. 
Griliches,  Zvi (1990). Patent statistics as economic indicators:  A survey. Journal 
of Economic  Literature  28:291-330. 
71. Ariel Pakes emphasizes this point in his discussion of this paper. 
72. A version of this is presented in Trajtenberg,  Henderson, and Jaffe  (1992). Knowledge  Spillovers  and  Creative  Destruction  ?  73 
Griliches,  Zvi  (1989).  Patents:  Recent  trends  and  puzzles.  Brookings  Papers on 
Economic  Activity,  Microeconomics  291-330. 
Griliches,  Zvi,  ed.  (1984). R&D, patents and productivity. Chicago: University  of 
Chicago  Press. 
Griliches,  Z. (1979). Issues  in assessing  the contribution  of R&D to productivity 
growth.  Bell Journal  of Economics  10(1):92-116. 
Grossman,  Gene  M.,  and  Elhanan  Helpman  (1991a). Innovation and Growth in 
the Global Economy, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Grossman,  Gene  M.,  and  Elhanan  Helpman  (1991b).  Quality  ladders  in  the 
theory  of growth.  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  106:557-586. 
Hall, B., et al. (1988). The R&D master file. NBER Technical working  paper No. 
72. 
Hall, B., Z. Griliches,  and J. Hausman  (1986). Patents and R&D: Is there a lag? 
International  Economic  Review  27:265-283. 
Hausman,  J., B. Hall, and Z. Griliches (1984). Econometric models  for count data 
with an application  to the patents-R&D relationship.  Econometrica  52:909-938. 
Jaffe, A. (1986). Technological  opportunity  and spillover of R&D: Evidence from 
firms'  patents,  profits,  and  market value.  American Economic  Review 76:984- 
1001. 
Jaffe, A.,  M. Trajtenberg, and  R. Henderson  (1993). Geographic  localization  of 
knowledge  spillovers  as  evidenced  by  patent  citations.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, forthcoming  (NBER working  paper No.  3993). 
Kortum,  S.  (1993). Equilibrium R&D and  the  decline  in the  patent-R&D ratio: 
U.S. evidence. American  Economic  Review:  Papers  and  Proceedings,  forthcoming. 
Tones,  C.  (1992).  R&D-based  models  of  economic  growth.  MIT mimeo,  No- 
vember. 
Levin,  R., et al.  (1987). Appropriating  the returns from industrial research and 
development. Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  3:784-829. 
Mansfield,  E. (1985). How  rapidly does  new  industrial technology  leak out? The 
Journal  of Industrial  Economics  34-2, December. 
Mansfield,  E., M. Schwartz,  and S. Wagner (1981). Imitation costs and patents: 
An empirical  study.  The Economic  Journal  91:907-918. 
Mansfield,  E.,  et  al.  (1977).  Social  and  private  rates  of return  from  industrial 
innovation.  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  91(2):221-240. 
Merton,  R. K. (1965). On  the Shoulders  of Giants.  New  York. 
Pakes,  A.  (1986). Patenting  as options:  Some  estimates  of the value  of holding 
European  patent  stocks.  Econometrica  54:766-784. 
Pakes,  A.  (1985). On patents,  R&D and the  stock market rate of return. Journal 
of Political  Economy  95:390-409. 
Pakes,  A.,  and  Z.  Griliches  (1984). Patents  and  R&D at the  firm level:  A first 
look.  In R&D, patents and productivity. Z.  Griliches,  ed.  Chicago: University 
of Chicago  Press. 
Pakes,  A.,  and  M.  Simpson  (1989).  Patent  renewal  data.  Brookings Papers on 
Economic  Activity,  Microeconomics. 
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous  technological  change.  Journal  of Political Econ- 
omy 98:S71-S102. 
Segerstrom,  Paul S. (1991). Innovation,  imitation  and economic  growth.  Journal 
of Political  Economy. 
Schankerman,  M.,  and A.  Pakes  (1986). Estimates  of the value  of patent  rights 
in  European  countries  during  the  post-1950  period.  Economic Journal 96: 
1077-1083. 74 * CABALLERO  & JAFFE 
Schmookler,  J. (1966).  Invention  and  Economic  Growth.  Cambridge,  MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Schumpeter,  J. (1942). Capitalism,  Socialism  and Democracy.  New York:  Harper. 
Stokey, N. L. (1992). R&D  and economic growth. Mimeo, June. 
Trajtenberg,  M., R. Henderson, and A. Jaffe  (1992).  Ivory tower versus corpo- 
rate  lab:  An empirical  study of basic research  and appropriability.  NBER  work- 
ing paper No. 4146, August. 
Comment 
PHILIPPE  AGHION 
Oxford  University  and E.B.R.D. 
This paper  is an important  contribution  to the  so-called  neo-Schumpe- 
terian theory  of  economic  growth.  The basic  trade-off  emphasized  by 
the  Schumpeterian  approach  is that between  the positive  spillovers  in- 
duced  by  current innovations  on  future  research  activities  on  the  one 
hand,  and the creative destruction  (or "obsolescence")  effect exerted by 
new  technologies  on the existing  ones  on the other hand.  The interplay 
between  the positive  and negative  externalities  respectively  involved  in 
the previous  two  effects  is known  to have  far-reaching implications  for 
the growth  process,  both  positive  and normative. 
This  paper  contributes  both  to  the  theoretical  and  empirical  under- 
standing  of  the  previous  trade-off.  It improves  upon  existing  models 
of  creative  destruction,  first by  relaxing  the  extreme  assumption  that 
successful  innovators  become  monopolies,  and by allowing  instead  for 
(asymmetric)  monopolistic  competition  between  old and new  technolo- 
gies:  Instead  of being  instantaneously  displaced  from a full monopoly 
position  by new  technologies,  the old technologies  can rely on the exis- 
tence of product differentiation  in order to remain in existence  (although 
with  a reduced  market share) even  after newer  technologies  have been 
implemented.  An interesting  consequence  of mixing up quality ladders 
and  product  variety  models  is  that  the  variety  parameter  (which  also 
measures  the degree  of product market competition)  affects both current 
profit and  the  equilibrium  amount  of creative  destruction:  The higher 
the  degree  of  substitutability  between  older  and  newer  products,  the 
larger is the creative  destruction  affect. 
The second,  and perhaps  more important,  theoretical contribution  of 
this paper  lies  in the  endogenization  of the research technology.  More 
specifically,  the productivity  of research now  depends  in a sophisticated 
way  upon  the whole  technological  history,  i.e.,  upon  the time distribu- 
tion of past innovations.  This, in turn, can help us understand  why  the 
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productivity  of research activities may evolve  over time and in particular 
why  it has  decreased  in the United  States in the recent decades. 
More precisely,  this paper  provides  the first empirical analysis  of re- 
search spillovers  and creative destruction  based  on microeconomic  patent 
data. Then  key  insight  is that data on patents  and on their citations by 
subsequent  patents  can serve  as a basis  to estimate  both  the degree  of 
intertemporal  spillovers  (i.e.,  the  positive  externality  that any  innova- 
tion exerts on the subsequent  ones)  and the  speed  of knowledge  obso- 
lescence  (measured  by the  speed  at which  the number  of citations  of a 
given  patent  by  subsequent  ones  declines  over  time).  The main result 
from this empirical analysis  is that research spillovers  generated  by suc- 
cessive  cohorts  of patented  innovations,  and measured  by their subse- 
quent  citations  by future patents,  have  substantially  declined  over this 
century,  hence  pointing  to  a  decline  in  the  productivity  of  research. 
(This in turn might account-although  the authors remain very cautious 
on this point-for  the slowdown  in aggregate  productivity  recently ob- 
served  in most  developed  countries.) 
Two  main  explanations  are suggested  by the  authors  in order to ac- 
count  for the  decline  in the average  number  of citations by future pat- 
ents.  One  is the fact that the  size  of patents,  measured  by the number 
of  new  ideas  embodied  in  them,  has  substantially  increased  over  the 
century.  In particular, the  number  of future  patents  that could  poten- 
tially cite current or past innovations  tends  to decrease  over time.  This 
first explanation  only  accounts  for the  decreasing  rate of citations,  but 
not  for the decreasing  research  (and output)  productivity. 
In this  respect  the  model  may  not  appear  entirely  consistent  in the 
sense  that the size of innovations,  as measured  by the quality parameter 
q, is supposed  to be constant  over time, whereas  the citation rate, which 
also  reflects  the  size  of  an  innovation,  is  allowed  to  vary  over  time. 
Endogenizing  the parameter q might in turn destroy  the linear relation- 
ship  between  N and  C and,  therefore,  the interpretation  of the results 
in terms of aggregate  productivity  slowdown. 
On the other hand,  there may be strategic and/or  organizational  rea- 
sons  for why  the  rate of  patent  citations  has  declined  over  time.  For 
example,  large  firms  (i.e.,  firms  with  a long  purse)  often  generate  or 
purchase  patents  that they  do not use  (or the use  of which  they  decide 
to delay),  primarily in order to prevent  entry by potential  competitors 
on the same product  market. This, however,  would  not account for the 
alleged  slowdown  in the productivity  of research, even  though  it would 
be consistent  with  the observed  decline  in the average rate of citations. 
More generally,  identifying  patents  as a reliable measure  of both the 
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of the organizational  environment  may be quite misleading.  In particu- 
lar,  it  is  known  that  research  activities  are  increasingly  governed  by 
complicated  inter-  or  intrafirm  contracts  whereby  property  rights  on 
innovations  are  often  split  between  research  employees  (or research 
units)  and  their employers  (or customers),  and  where  the  governance 
structure  (full vertical  integration,  research  joint venture,  etc.)  has  an 
important effect on the incentive  to produce and/or diffuse new technol- 
ogies.  The  relationship  between  new  ideas  and  patents  is thus  bound 
to evolve  over  time  and  follow  the evolution  of the organizational  and 
legal  frameworks  for R&D activities:  In other words,  patents  may just 
be the tip of a more complicated  iceberg,  with  no invariant relationship 
between  the  rate of patents  citations  and  the  rate of knowledge  obso- 
lescence. 
A  second  explanation  for  (or possible  implication  of)  the  observed 
decline  in the rate of patent citation in the United States is the increasing 
rate of knowledge  obsolescence.  Again,  the relationship  between  these 
two  phenomena  is far from obvious.  First, as the rate of technological 
discovery  has  greatly  accelerated  in recent  decades,  all the  parties  in- 
volved  in patent citation (the innovators  and his or her examiners)  may 
share  the  same  incentive  to  avoid  informational  and  administrative 
overload  and,  therefore,  reduce  the number  of patent citations prior to 
a  given  time  period.  In  that  case,  a  declining  rate of  patent  citation 
would  be no evidence  either of an increasing  rate of knowledge  obsoles- 
cence  or of a decline  in the productivity  of research. 
Second,  as  suggested  in  the  paper,  innovations  may  have  become 
increasingly  specialized.  This  would  instead  be  consistent  with  an in- 
creasing  rate of obsolescence  although  not necessarily  with  a decline  in 
the  productivity  of  research.  In  order  to  be  further  investigated  and 
tested,  this  latter  explanation  would  require  that  the  basic  neo- 
Schumpeterian  model  be  extended  so  as  to  introduce  the  distinction 
between  fundamental  (or general)  and secondary  (or specialized)  inno- 
vations.  This  in turn would  allow  for the  possibility  of Schumpeterian 
waves  in equilibrium  and for a richer discussion  of the dynamic  evolu- 
tion of technological  spillovers  and obsolescence.  In particular, it might 
be interesting  to investigate  whether  the alleged  decline  in the produc- 
tivity  of  research  over  the  last  (two)  decades  is bound  to be infinitely 
durable  or  instead  corresponds  to  the  temporary  downfall  part  of  a 
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ARIEL PAKES 
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This  is  an  ambitious  and  creative  paper.  It tries  to  mix  theory  with 
data to throw  some  light  on how  the interactions  among  agents  in the 
production  of knowledge  affect growth  and welfare.  The mix of theory 
and data serves  to focus discussion  on magnitudes  that might have both 
empirical  and  theoretical  content.  It also  generates  a framework  that 
allows  us to use  the  empirical estimates  to evaluate  various  policy  and 
descriptive  scenarios.  The authors  view  their framework as a structure 
that will  evolve  over time as they  interact more with  different  types  of 
data.  My  comments  will  be  made  with  subsequent  reformulations  of 
their framework  in mind. 
1. The  Model 
The  theory  is  very  simple,  as  it  should  be  in  this  stage  of  research. 
Products  are  differentiated  by  a  "vertical"-quality  dimension.  New 
products  are  produced  by  research  resources,  have  the  same  cost  of 
production  as old products,  and extend the quality frontier. The produc- 
tivity  of research  in producing  new  products  depends  on the informa- 
tion  made  available  by  the  outcomes  of  past  research.  (Past research 
generates  a nonpecuniary  externality to new  research.) Given the prod- 
ucts that have been  developed,  a Nash  equilibrium in prices determines 
current returns.  That equilibrium implies  that new  products  "obsolete" 
old products.  (New  products  cause  old products  to earn less; a pecuni- 
ary externality.)  Note  that there is no physical  obsolescence  of products; 
if there are no new  products  then the value of the knowledge  embodied 
in  the  old  products  does  not  decay  over  time.  Although  this  is  not 
correct for all types  of knowledge,  it is probably close enough  to correct 
for the  vast  majority of the  output  of industrial  knowledge-producing 
activities.  (An example  of a type  of knowledge  whose  physical  produc- 
tivity  does  decay  through  use  is  the  knowledge  embodied  in  insecti- 
cides;  frequently  use  of  an  insecticide  leads  to  the  development  of 
resistant  strains  in  the  insect  population.)  There is  a single  consumer 
who  consumes  all products  and generates  the needed  demand  curves, 
while  a  free-entry  assumption  together  with  equilibrium  in  the  labor 
market determines  the amount  of product  development. 
Note  that  there  is  only  one  dimension  to  the  quality  of  a product. 78 . PAKES 
This  simplification  should  only  bother  us  if it constrains  the  empirical 
work in ways  that are either at odds  with,  or causes  us to misinterpret, 
the data. I will note  later where  this assumption  may become  problem- 
atic. On the other hand,  it is not obvious  that we  can do away with the 
assumption  that quality has  only  one  dimension  without  a much  more 
extensive  modeling  effort. They make a second  simplification,  however, 
which  is probably both  more  problematic  and easier to rectify. 
They  currently  do  not  allow  for  either  any  uncertainty  or  for  any 
unobserved  factors  to  affect  the  relationship  between  research  inputs 
and  research  output.  One  of  the  striking  results  of empirical  work  in 
this  field is precisely  the enormous  variance in the outcomes  of indus- 
trial research  activity,  and  there is good  reason  to think that this vari- 
ance  does  not  "average  out"  when  we  look  at the  sum  of  individual 
outcomes.  In the  more directed  research that policymakers  are usually 
concerned  with  (e.g.,  energy  saving  research  or research  on  reducing 
emissions  of pollutants),  the fact that the randomness  does  not average 
out  across  research  enterprises  is  because  the  different  firms  are  all 
exploring  the  same  unknown  frontier,  and  the  extent  to  which  that 
frontier can yield  to current knowledge  is a common  factor that affects 
the  outcomes  of all research.  Further, there is a good  deal of evidence 
that shows  that the productivity  in research in different fields is highly 
correlated.  That is,  historians  tell us that there are periods  of relatively 
rapid technological  development,  usually  foreshadowed  by an advance 
in  a "metatechnology"  that  can be  used  in  the  development  of many 
new  types  of products  (synthetic  materials in the postwar  period,  and 
semiconductors  thereafter; see  the classic article by Rosenberg,  1974). 
I worry  about  ignoring  the  unobserved  components  in the  relation- 
ship  between  industrial  research  inputs  and  outputs  both  because  I 
think  we  could  incorporate  it in  ways  that would  enhance  the  frame- 
work  significantly,  and because  the exclusion  of it is going  to generate 
biases  in the rest of our estimates.  First on what we  miss.  In reality the 
productivity  of  industrial  research  depends  on  the  outcomes  of  the 
(more  basic)  research  done  in  our  universities  and  national  research 
labs. It would  be interesting  to hook  the unobserved  component  of the 
productivity  term  back  to  this,  more  basic,  research  and  quantify  its 
impacts.  In this  context,  I should  note  that patents  not  only  cite other 
patents,  they also cite key articles that were used  in their development. 
By ignoring  the unobserved  productivity  components,  we  are also giv- 
ing up on the problem  of coming  up with  a quantitative  measure  of the 
uncertainty  associated  with  research  outcomes.  This can be important 
in its own  right, especially  in more detailed  models  where  the extent of Comment * 79 
uncertainty  might  have  an  impact  on  both  how  much  and  on  which 
type  of research we  want  to get engaged  in. 
The estimation  problem  created by ignoring  the unobserved  compo- 
nents  of  the  outcomes  of  the  research  process  is  just  the  traditional 
simultaneous  equations  problem in estimating  production  type relation- 
ships.  (The classic reference  here is Marschak and Andrews,  1944.) Pe- 
riods  when  the  unobserved  productivity  is high  will  be periods  when 
firms are induced  to expand  their research activities,  so standard least- 
square  analysis  of measures  of research  output  against  research  input 
will  give  you  biased  coefficients.  (For a recent  attempt  to handle  this 
problem  at an industry  level  of aggregation,  see  Kortum,  1993.) 
2.  Overview of the Empirical  Analysis 
The empirical analysis  has  four equations: 
1.  A citation equation  that is used to obtain both a measure of the extent 
to which  past research has an impact on current research productiv- 
ity (the nonpecuniary  externality  discussed  earlier), and the relation- 
ship between  patents  and knowledge  output. 
2.  An  innovation  production  function  in  which  "inputs"  are current 
research  expenditures  and  the  citation  measure  of current research 
productivity,  and  the output  is the patents-based  measure  obtained 
from 1. 
3.  A growth  equation  that relates either consumption  or labor produc- 
tivity to the measure  of the outcomes  of research activity. 
4.  A  creative  destruction  equation  that  analyzes  the  relationship  of 
stock  market  values  of  firms  to  a  firm's  own  patents,  and  to  the 
patents  of the  other firms in the  same  industry.  (The latter gives  us 
the effect  of the pecuniary  externality  discussed  earlier.) 
I begin with some  general points  and then focus in on a more detailed 
discussion  of the first equations  in this system. 
Although  much  of  the  modern  growth  literature  is  focused  on  the 
impacts of externalities  of one form or the other, almost all of the empiri- 
cal work  that emanated  from it used  only  aggregate  data. The essence 
of externalities  in the interrelationships  among units,  and the externality 
impact we  are looking  for is often  a difference  between  a "micro" and 
an  "aggregate"  response  function.  It is hard to believe  that one  could 
provide  convincing  evidence  of the impact of interrelationships  among 
agents,  and/or  of a difference  between  aggregate  and  micro response 80 . PAKES 
functions,  from  an  empirical  analysis  that  relied  solely  on  aggregate 
data. This paper actually goes  back to the micro fundamentals  and tries 
to  estimate  the  impact  of  the  externality  generating  relationships  di- 
rectly.  This is a much  more  convincing  way  of determining  the impor- 
tance of the basic assumptions  underlying  the model,  and it is also likely 
to be much  more fruitful in pointing  to directions  where  both our mod- 
els  and  our empirical work  are likely to bear fruit. 
The second  striking aspect  of the empirical work is the use of citation 
data. To measure  externalities  effectively  we  need  to know  which  bit of 
knowledge  is "closer" to which  other.  (If they all have the same impact, 
then  there is only  an aggregate  effect that is the same to all and,  hence, 
whose  impact is very hard to distinguish  from the impact of other time 
invariant variables.)  The citation variable is an independent  measure  of 
the  "distance"  between  different  "bits" of knowledge  and,  hence,  can 
be used  to examine  the quantitative impact of various forms of externali- 
ties.  (And  recall that it is these  externalities  that lie at the heart of any 
difference  between  the social and private return to research and, hence, 
of policy  analysis.) 
The citation data are used  here to obtain a measure  of the impact past 
knowledge  has on the production  of new  knowledge  (the nonpecuniary 
externality  noted  earlier).  Here  the  basic concept  is that the  patentees 
cite patents  whose  information  content  was  used  in the production  of 
the knowledge  embodied  in the patent.  This,  however,  is not the only 
possible  use  of  the  citation  data.  Because  the  purpose  of  the  patent 
references  is  to  cite  prior state  of  the  art, one  could  have  thought  of 
using  citations  to construct  a measure  of the  extent  to which  different 
pieces  of knowledge  have been made obsolete.  This would  have allowed 
us  to use  the  citation  data to help  construct  measures  of obsolescence 
for the analysis  of creative destruction.  More to the overall point,  there 
is probably some  content  to both of these  interpretations  of the citation 
data, and,  had we  done  both  types  of analysis,  we  might have learned 
more about how  best  to use  the citation figures  in future research. 
3. The  Citation  Equation 
This equation serves two purposes: 
1.  It determines  the  usefulness  of  past  cohorts  of  patents  in  current 
knowledge  production  and,  hence,  determines  current research pro- 
ductivity. 
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To see  how  both  these  things  are done  in one  equation,  it is helpful 
to  examine  the  structure  of  that  equation.  Its  dependent  variable  is 
ats =  cites to cohort s from patents  sampled  in t per patent in t divided 
by number  of patents  in s. If we  look  at their specification  in logs  and 
do  not  impose  some  of their constraints  on functional  forms,  what  we 
have  is 
ln(ats) = g1(t) + g2(s) +  g3(t  -  s) +  g4  A knowledgej 
A knowledgej 
=  A Nj =  ijPj, 
where  Pj is  patents  granted  in j,  and  ij  measures  the  knowledge  per 
patent  in cohort j. 
Here g4()  measures  the  degree  to which  patents  in cohort  "s" have 
become  obsolete  and,  hence,  contain  less  useful  ideas,  for cohort "t"'s 
use.  In a unidimensional  quality mode,  where  each good  improves  on 
the  quality  of other  goods,  it makes  some  sense  to make the  extent  of 
obsolescence  of period s goods  a function  of the number of new  goods, 
or the  amount  of  "new  knowledge,"  produced  between  s and  t,  and 
this  is what  they  have  done.  Note,  however,  that this  determines  the 
relationship  between  patents  and knowledge  for the rest of the analysis, 
i.e.,  knowledge  per  patent  in  a cohort  becomes  equal  to  the  obsoles- 
cence  effect  per patent  of a cohort. 
In  a  model  with  more  than  one  quality  dimension,  this  would  no 
longer  seem  like a natural assumption,  and,  indeed,  it is easy  to think 
of new  patents  that actually  enhanced  the  productivity  of the ideas  in 
old  patents.  So I would  have  preferred  to have  a different  weight  for 
patents  in g4( ) than the weight  given  to patents in the definition  of A N. 
This would  have  required more econometrics,  probably a simultaneous 
equations  analysis  of the whole  system,  and as a result may best be left 
for a different analysis.  Still this is one case where  the added  economet- 
rics might  well  be  worth  it; the  measure  of research  productivity  and 
the measure  of knowledge  increments  are the basic inputs  into the sub- 
sequent  analysis  of how  knowledge  affects the economic  magnitudes  in 
the  subsequent  analysis. 
The other factors affecting  ats  are as follows: 
gl(),  the  time  effect,  is  meant  to  pick up  changes  in  the  institutional 
regime  that lead  to more citations  for a given  number  of used  ideas. 
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g2()  provides  a measure  of the  importance  of the ideas  in a cohort for 
subsequent  citations;  i.e.,  it is our measure  of the  "externality inten- 
sity" of a cohort.  (This appears  in the paper as  s,8). 
g3( ) is a function  of age that they  argue has to do with  diffusion  of the 
ideas  in a cohort  [appears in the paper as a transform of y(t-s)]. 
It is  well  known  that  one  cannot  estimate  free functions  of cohort, 
age,  and time,  so they have to impose  some  constraints.  Their specifica- 
tion allows  gl(  ) to be free (and it picks up a secular increase in citation 
intensity),  approximates  g2( ) with a combination  of dummies  and poly- 
nomials,  and makes  linearity assumptions  on both g3()  and g4(). 
I pause  here to consider  the implications  of the specification  for g4(), 
which  has 
g4()  =  3  jPt_j 
j=s 
with  the normalization  ,3 =  1. The linearity assumption  is a very strong 
assumption,  which  is not really consistent  with past micro work of Jaffe 
and  some  of his coauthors.  It bothers  me for a couple  of reasons. 
First, one  of their major findings  is that there is a secular decline  in 
the  {6s}, or in  the  usefulness  of  cohorts  of  patents  in  producing  new 
knowledge.  This is a major part of their explanation  of the  secular de- 
cline in the patent  to research ratio. I am worried that the estimated  fall 
in the {8s} series is simply an artifact of the fact that old patents are cited 
more than their exponential  decay warrants, i.e.,  if we had a longer time 
series,  the  current  generation  of  young  patents  would  also  pick  up 
larger bs's. 
More generally  the linearity  in g4()  is also  determining  the  shape  of 
the {iJs,  which  in turn is fed back into their analysis  of the productivity 
of research  resources  and,  hence,  affects  all subsequent  analysis.  As  a 
first  step  to  seeing  whether  this  linearity  is  indeed  a  problem,  they 
might  have  used  some  more flexible functional  forms here  (add a qua- 
dratic  and  maybe  a  cubic  term,  or,  better  yet,  try  a  combination  of 
dummies  and  polynomials  that  would  allowed  for  bell-shaped  pat- 
terns).  Here  are some  more general  comments  on the empirical results 
from estimating  the citation equation. 
The  most  important  thing  to  take  from Table 2 is  that allowing  for 
intervening  ideas  (in the  form of  patents)  in  addition  to the  time  and 
cohort effects,  improves  the fit quite markedly.  This makes it clear that 
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the  notion  of obsolescence  they  are after. My problems,  then,  are just 
in  the  detailed  interpretation  they  provide  for an effect  that is  clearly 
present.  Their intepretation  left me  troubled  in the following  ways. 
First,  they  find  that  the  ij  =  gl(j)  are almost  perfectly  negatively 
correlated  with  the  8j =  g2(j).  If I interpret  this  correctly,  it says  that 
cohorts  that are cited  disproportionately  actually do not make obsolete 
as much past old knowledge  as cohorts that are not cited as much.  This 
may  well  be  true,  but  my  intuition  says  that  if it is,  then  the  model 
should  have  more  than  one  "quality" dimension,  in which  case  there 
is  something  wrong  with  the  underlying  framework  we  are using  to 
interpret  the  relationships  in the  data.  In particular, how  do we  know 
that it is the ij  that should  be used  to construct  the  AN' in the  subse- 
quent  analysis,  and not  some  combination  of the ~j and the 6j (particu- 
larly because  firms  tend  to  have  base  patents  that  they  build  on  and 
cite with  their subsequent  work)? 
Second  renewal  data indicates  a negative  correlation between  quan- 
tity  and  the  average  private value  of  the  patent  rights  in  a cohort  of 
patents.  (Empirically this is just a negative  correlation between  the size 
of the  cohort  and  the  fraction  of the  patents  in the  cohort  that find  it 
profitable  to  pay  renewal  fees  to keep  their patents  in  force in subse- 
quent  years.)  The  simplest  explanation  is  that more  stringent  rules  at 
the  patent  office  cause  the  less  valuable  patents  not  to apply,  and be- 
cause  the  patent  distribution  is  highly  skewed  with  many  patents  of 
very low value,  the induced  change  in the number of patents in a cohort 
can  be  quite  large  even  though  the  change  in  the  total  value  of  the 
cohort  is  negligible.  (See  Pakes  and  Simpson,  1989, and  the  literature 
cited  therein.)  Renewal  data  attempt  to  measure  the  private  value  of 
patent  rights,  and this value  is different  from the value  of "patents"  in 
augmenting  aggregate  productivity  or aggregate consumption  (which is 
closer  to  a social,  than  a private,  value  concept).  Still we  might  have 
expected  the two concepts  to be positively  correlated, and it bothers me 
that this  paper  finds,  for the  most  part, a positive  correlation between 
their quantity  and  "average value"  estimates  of cohorts  of patents. 
Finally, the standard errors in this and subsequent  tables are probably 
not believable.  Part of the problem  is that they  never  are explicit about 
where  the disturbances  enter.  (In principle  this should  be either where 
the  researchers  think  they  are missing  an  important  piece  of  data  or 
where  there is true randomness  in outcomes.)  As a result,  it is hard to 
figure  out  appropriate  ways  of  calculating  standard  errors,  but  what 
they  actually do is not robust to much.  For example,  a reasonable  place 
to think  the  model  is missing  is in using  a constant  cite intensity  of a 
cohort,  so say we  change  to g2(s) +  Et,,  and let Et, be serially correlated 84  PAKES 
over time. That would imply both dependence in the residuals of their 
equations, and heteroscedasticity. The current standard errors do not 
make a correction  for either of these. 
4. The  Last  Three  Equations 
As far as I know all the citation analysis that has appeared in the eco- 
nomic literature  to date is, in a sense, self-contained, i.e.,  it uses cita- 
tions to measure which patents are closer to which others, but it does 
not bring that measure of closeness to bear in the analysis of other 
economic phenomena we want to explain. The innovation production 
function in this paper does just that; it asks whether the citation based 
measure of research productivity (0) can help explain the relationship 
between industrial research and patents, and this is an important  next 
step in the analysis. 
The estimation results indicate that 0 does indeed help explain re- 
search productivity.  Indeed, to see this we need only compare  the series 
of the ratio of their patents-based knowledge measure to research ex- 
penditures (iPIR),  to the series on 0. The troublesome aspect of their 
finding is that it all seems to be coming from two trends; one in iP/R, 
and one in 0, i.e.,  the higher-frequency  movements of the two series 
do not seem to be correlated. Thus, I would have liked them to also 
have allowed a time interaction,  and see if their results survive. If they 
don't, and my guess is they will not, then the results should be inter- 
preted as providing one potential source of a time trend in the patents 
to R&D  ratio;  other heavily trending variables  are other possibilities. So 
I view this as perhaps promising, but not strong evidence, in support 
of a hypothesis. Consequently they have not totally convinced me of the 
usefulness of citation data in determining the productivity of research 
resources in producing patents. That is another reason that I would 
have liked to see the citation data used in the obsolescence analysis. 
I should note here there are data reasons why they might not be 
picking up the higher-frequency  movements in the  iPIR series. First, 
they have done a serial  correlation  adjustment  in the innovation  produc- 
tion function analysis. This seems to me to produce an inconsistency in 
the timing used to construct  9O,  i.e., if patents are a distributed  lag over 
past knowledge increments, then the citations of those patents should 
also be a distributed lag of the citations made by the past knowledge 
increments. Also they use patents by grant date in the first part of the 
analysis and patents by application  date in this part of the analysis;  and 
there is a long and variable lag between these two series. These kinds 
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would  help their results a lot by correcting them.  (It might,  for example, 
allow  them  to  pick  up  the  higher  frequency  movements  in  the  iPIR 
series.) 
Finally,  two  brief comments  on  the  analysis  of creative  destruction. 
First,  I reiterate  that  it  would  be  interesting  to  integrate  the  citation 
information  into  the  stock  market  analysis.  Second,  I worry  that  the 
current analysis  of growth  of firm value ignores  the growth  in the other 
assets  of the  firm (growth  in physical  capital,  e.g.),  especially  because 
we  have  good  reason  to believe  the growth  in physical  capital is related 
to  the  growth  in the  firm's new  products.  In this  context,  it might  be 
easier  to build  a specific  stochastic  structure  into  the  model  and  then 
estimate  parameters off the one period rate of return on the firm's stock 
(which has a cleaner interpretation in terms of revisions  of information). 
To conclude,  let me  point  out  that despite  all these  caveats,  the  au- 
thors get interesting  results  on every  equation.  What I take from this is 
that there  is a data base  available  that should  allow  us  to fill in many 
of the details  needed  to use  their framework to understand  the growth 
process. 
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Discussion 
While lauding  the results  in the paper,  Zvi Griliches suggested  that the 
citation  data  must  be  interpreted  carefully.  For example,  the  fact that 
citations  to  a patent  cease  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  knowledge 
associated  with  the  patent  has  been  made  obsolete:  Economists  today 
readily use the Cobb-Douglas  production  function without  citing Doug- 
las explicitly.  Moreover,  as the authors are certainly aware, patents  and 
citations  are an artifact of a certain process,  and that process  is distor- 
tionary.  Citations  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  knowledge  that influ- 
ences  the  inventor;  often  they  are placed  into  the  article by the  patent 
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would  help their results a lot by correcting them.  (It might,  for example, 
allow  them  to  pick  up  the  higher  frequency  movements  in  the  iPIR 
series.) 
Finally,  two  brief comments  on  the  analysis  of creative  destruction. 
First,  I reiterate  that  it  would  be  interesting  to  integrate  the  citation 
information  into  the  stock  market  analysis.  Second,  I worry  that  the 
current analysis  of growth  of firm value ignores  the growth  in the other 
assets  of the  firm (growth  in physical  capital,  e.g.),  especially  because 
we  have  good  reason  to believe  the growth  in physical  capital is related 
to  the  growth  in the  firm's new  products.  In this  context,  it might  be 
easier  to build  a specific  stochastic  structure  into  the  model  and  then 
estimate  parameters off the one period rate of return on the firm's stock 
(which has a cleaner interpretation in terms of revisions  of information). 
To conclude,  let me  point  out  that despite  all these  caveats,  the  au- 
thors get interesting  results  on every  equation.  What I take from this is 
that there  is a data base  available  that should  allow  us  to fill in many 
of the details  needed  to use  their framework to understand  the growth 
process. 
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Discussion 
While lauding  the results  in the paper,  Zvi Griliches suggested  that the 
citation  data  must  be  interpreted  carefully.  For example,  the  fact that 
citations  to  a patent  cease  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  knowledge 
associated  with  the  patent  has  been  made  obsolete:  Economists  today 
readily use the Cobb-Douglas  production  function without  citing Doug- 
las explicitly.  Moreover,  as the authors are certainly aware, patents  and 
citations  are an artifact of a certain process,  and that process  is distor- 
tionary.  Citations  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  knowledge  that influ- 
ences  the  inventor;  often  they  are placed  into  the  article by the  patent 86 *  DISCUSSION 
editor. As another example,  the body of knowledge  available for citation 
is getting larger and larger, but the bibliography  of a patent has a natural 
size  constraint,  i.e.,  how  much  the  editors  will  accept.  Patents  that 
might  otherwise  be cited will be crowded  out,  but this need  not reflect 
obsolescence. 
Regarding  the relatively quick diffusion  found  in the paper,  Griliches 
noted  that again the patenting  process  may be relevant.  Patent examin- 
ers are responsible  for specific types  of patents.  Therefore,  when  a pat- 
ent application  is received,  the patent examiner is cognizant  of the most 
recent  patents  granted  in the  field  and  may require these  in the list of 
citations.  The  diffusion  measured  in the  paper  is the  diffusion  among 
patent  examiners,  not  the  diffusion  of  the  innovation  in  the  average 
productivity  of the economy. 
Roland  Benabou  wondered  if  there  have  been  sudden  changes  in 
patent regulations  such as application fees,  royalty rates, or the duration 
of patents  that might be used  to distinguish  variations in the propensity 
to  patent  from  the  other  effects  that  we  are really interested  in.  Jaffe 
responded  that the largest change  in the United  States was in the early 
1980s,  when  patent  renewal  fees  were  instituted.  Beginning  in  1985, 
data is available on whether  or not inventors  renew their patents.  Pakes 
and  others  have  worked  with  European  patents  where  renewal  fees 
have  been  in place  for a longer  period  of time.  Griliches noted  that in 
recent years, patent fees have also increased  sharply. Interestingly,  Jaffe 
remarked,  the  rate of  patenting  has  risen  dramatically over  this  same 
period. 
Benabou  also  suggested  that  royalty  fees  should  be  included  in the 
valuation  equation  for patents:  If your  innovation  will  require paying 
royalty fees on the patents  that are cited,  this will presumably  affect the 
valuation  of  the  innovation.  Jaffe responded  that  in  fact,  an  inventor 
generally  does  not  have  to  pay  the  owners  of  patents  that  are cited. 
This  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  product  that is  manufactured  and 
sold.  If you  sell  a product  that  incorporates  both  your  invention  and 
the  cited inventions,  you  have  to pay royalties.  In principle,  however, 
a patent  is a statement  by the patent  office that your invention  is suffi- 
ciently  freestanding  that it is a product in and of itself,  and no royalties 
are required. 